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In the design of new products and systems, the mitigation of potential failures is 
very important.  The sooner in a product’s design mitigation can be performed, the lower 
the cost and easier to implement those mitigations become.  However, currently, most 
mitigations strategies rely on the expertise of the engineers designing a product, and 
while models and for failure modes do exist to help, there are no guidelines for 
performing product changes to reduce risk.  To help alleviate this, the risk mitigation 
strategy taxonomy is created from an empirical collection of mitigation strategies used in 
industry for failure mitigation, creating a consistent set of definitions for 
electromechanical risk mitigation strategies.  By storing mitigation data in this consistent 
format, the data can be used to evaluate and compare different mitigation strategies.  
Applying this, the Generated Risk Event Effect Neutralization (GREEN) method is used 
to generate mitigation strategies for a product during the conceptual design of the 
product, where changes are the easiest to implement and cost the least.  The GREEN 
method then compares and selects the best strategy based on the popularity, likelihood 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Failure prevention in a product is an important consideration in the design of a 
new product.  Focusing on prevention during the conceptual stage of design can have a 
great impact on the cost of the product, as the largest changes can be made with the least 
overall cost.  However, this process is often difficult, as communicating risk mitigation 
strategies are often difficult. 
When trying to communicate risk mitigations strategies, proper communication of 
the context of the strategy is important.  Information on the risk, the change, and its 
effects must be clearly stated, in a way that others can understand and implement the 
strategy.  Further, in order to store data on those strategies, there needs to be a clear set of 
attributes that can be used to define a mitigation strategy. 
These attributes allow for the creation of a consistent language of mitigation 
strategies to be created.  This risk mitigation strategy taxonomy is a collection of 42 
defined electromechanical mitigation strategies, derived from case studies of successful 
mitigation strategies.  Using this set of defined strategies, mitigation can be performed on 
a product by identifying failure modes, and then selecting potential mitigation strategies 
that have been used to correct the failure in the past. 
Further, the taxonomy can be used as a tool to help collect data and use it to 
generate mitigation strategies based on the parameters the strategies have changed, and 
the parameters that correspond to the failure modes they mitigate.  This method, the 
Generated Risk Event Effect Neutralization method, allows mitigation strategies to be 
generated during the conceptual stage of design, and integrated into the product from the 
very beginning.  Also, the method allows those with minimal experience in risk 
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mitigation to mitigate failures in a product, and supplements the experience of those who 
are already experienced in risk mitigation. 
This dissertation presents the construction of the risk mitigation strategy 
taxonomy, and its use in risk mitigation.  Further, it demonstrates the use of the taxonomy 
along with failure mode parameters and the failure mode taxonomy to allow the 
generation of mitigation strategies during the conceptual design, the Generated Risk 
Event Effect Neutralization (GREEN) method.  Finally, it covers how to collect and 
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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to introduce a method that will mitigate product 
risks during the conceptual design phase by identifying design variables that affect 
product failures.  By using this comprehensive, step-by-step process that combines 
existing techniques in a new way, designers can begin with a simple Functional Model 
and emerge from the conceptual design phase with specific components selected with 
many risks already mitigated.  The Risk in Early Design (RED) method plays a 
significant role in identifying failure modes by functions, and these modes are then 
analyzed through modeling equations or lifespan analyses, in such a manner that 
emphasizes variables under the designers’ control.  With the valuable insight this method 
provides, informed decisions can be made early in the process, thereby eliminating costly 
changes later on. 
 




Failure in a product is an important point to consider in the design of a new 
product.  Despite being designed by teams of trained engineers using risk analysis tools 
such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis, and event tree 
analysis, many products in today’s market experience failure during use.  These products 
that can pose a safety risk are recalled after production by organizations like the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission  (CPSC) or the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA).  In 2008 alone, the CPSC recalled 563 different products, numbering almost 60.8 
million units [1].   
Further, the conceptual design phase can have a great impact on the overall cost 
of the product.  This portion of the design phase, which tends to cost only 5 percent of the 
design cost, can change the cost of a product by up to 50 percent [2].  Finding a way to 
limit the failures during this early, very cost efficient portion of the design process would 
be beneficial to the company, as well as the eventual customer for the product. 
During the initial stages of design, different concepts for a product are created 
through a variety of means.  These product concepts can use a variety of components, 
each having different modes of failure.  Choosing or designing the best component for 
the product is often a long, subjective process requiring several iterations.  However, by 
applying analytical methods, such as the one suggested in this paper, potential solutions 
can be selected or designed for a product with a focus on limiting the potential failure.  
The method presented in this paper presents a means to select or design components to 
remove or limit the failures with the greatest likelihood and consequence of occurrence. 
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In this paper, a means of using existing failure information to help select and 
design components for use in a new product through the means of combining the Risk in 
Early Design method and models of failure is shown.  This method is then demonstrated 
through the case study of a wind turbine unit. 
 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Concept Selection 
The conceptual stage of design focuses on identifying actions that the system or 
product must perform, organizing those actions into a logical model of the product, and 
then develop potential product concepts by selecting or designing components.  This 
process generates many potential concepts, and then evaluates them based on design 
criteria.  These concepts are refined many times until a final, single concept is decided 
upon [2].   
Several different concept generation techniques exist.  Selection design uses 
components that currently exist to design a new product, while configuration design 
focuses on the configuration of existing components to improve the design.  Parametric 
design changes aspects of a design to create new products, whereas original design is the 
creation of new products that are different from those that currently exist [3].   
These types of concept generation can be assisted by a number of tools, such as 
using multiple members of a design team to create ideas, and then expand on them.  
Some of these tools are the 6-3-5 method, which calls for each member of the team to 
create three ideas, and then spend time adding to each other’s ideas [4], or the Theory of 
Inventive Problem Solving (TRIZ), which uses the concept that the current problem to be 
solved by this product has been solved in another design for an unrelated reason [5].  
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Another set of these tools are morphological methods, where specific components are 
matched to the actions a product must perform.  These methods can be accomplished 
through brainstorming using the above tools to identify as many solutions as possible for 
a given action, or by using a digital design repository and design structure matrices to 
determine the components [4, 6].   
Recently, a computational tool called MEMIC was introduced by Arnold, Stone, 
and McAdams.  This tool takes a model of the new product’s actions and uses an online 
design repository to create a morphological matrix based on existing solutions to those 
actions.  As the user selects component solutions, the program will also remove 
incompatible solutions from further down the list, allowing a novice engineer to generate 
concepts based on morphological methods [7].  However, none of these design methods 
involve risk analysis in their approach. 
 
2.2 Risk Analysis 
To aid the designer in finding potential risks to a system, there are several 
methods available.  Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) uses backwards logic to trace a failure in a 
mature system to its possible causes.  Beginning with this failure, called the “top fault,” 
potential other faults that could cause or contribute to the top fault occurrence are 
determined.  The potential causes for these faults are then determined, repeating this step 
until all of the potential root faults are located.  Then, using team experience, the 
probability of each potential fault occurring is determined, allowing an overall probability 
for a given chain of faults occurring [8, 9]. 
Similarly, Event Tree Analysis (ETA) traces a chain of failure from a single 
initiating event, although unlike FTA, this method uses forward logic [10].  Starting from 
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the “initiating event,” paths are created showing the possible events that can occur in the 
system, leading to the ultimate failure.  Each path is a binary choice, though in some 
cases both choices can have the same outcome.  Like Fault Tree Analysis, it requires a 
mature system, and uses the experience of the engineer performing the analysis to 
generate probabilities of the individual events occurring [11].   
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) describes areas of potential failures 
in a system and their severities.  Each potential failure mode lists the component affected, 
the consequences of the failure, and potential solutions to either mitigate or eliminate that 
failure mode  [12].   
The Risk in Early Design (RED) method uses historical failures to determine 
potential failures of a new product.  Using a historical database of failures, RED 
calculates the likelihood and consequence of an action of the product failing by a 
particular failure mode.  RED can be performed during the conceptual phase of design as 
if focuses on the actions a product performs rather than the components that make up the 
product  [13]. 
Function-failure identification and propagation (FFIP) uses a combination of two 
models of a system to trace potential failures through a system.  The first functional 
model is built based on the actions the system must perform, the second model is a 
configuration model based on the configuration of components in the system.  Based on 
these two models, potential failures are tied to the actions they perform, and a simulation 
is run using a starting failure.  Based on that starting failure and the relationships taken 




Like FFIP, function-based failure propagation uses a functional model to predict 
the likelihood of a chain of failures occurring.  This method uses RED to detect the 
actions of a new system most likely to start a chain of failures, and traces all of the 
potential chains that lead to actions the system is most dependant on.  Using historical 
failure propagation data collected from failure reports  [15], the likelihood of each chain 
of failures occurring is calculated using Boolean operations, allowing the designer to find 
the chains of failures most likely to occur [16]. 
Throughout all of these function-failure based methods, a consistent language of 
failure modes should be used.  This failure mode taxonomy originally consisted of only 
mechanical failure modes [17, 18], but in recent years, has been expanded to cover 
electrical failure modes as well [19, 20].  This taxonomy provides a single, consistent 
language of failures, and can be used to quantify data uniformly, as well as meaningfully 
communicate those results to other engineers. 
While all of these methods aid in the finding of potential or already existing 
failures in products, they lack a technique to limit that failure.  For this purpose, risk 
mitigation methods are required.  By combining these methods with risk mitigation 
methods, better products can be designed. 
 
2.3 Risk Mitigation 
Reliability prediction strategies, such as penalty functions, show methods to 
determine further risk analysis methods that should be applied for different systems, or 
which systems are most reliable.  Penalty functions can be used alongside genetic 
algorithms to find an optimal design solution based on reliability and cost.  From an 
initial set of solutions, child solutions are created and then rated for their feasibility.  This 
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adapting penalty function eliminates the most unfeasible solution, and the remaining 
feasible solutions are used to generate new children until an optimal solution appears  
[21].   
The system reliability prioritization method proposed by Coit uses the uncertainty 
of different methods to determine which components need additional analysis.  From 
certain cases, the uncertainty of a particular component will have little effect on the 
prediction of the reliability of the entire system.  By using the normalized variance of the 
system reliability, the components that add the most variance to the system can be 
identified for further analysis [22].  
These methods are not the only ways that potential failures for a product can be 
found.  Sometimes, the mode of failure is known, and only how long it will take for the 
failure to manifest is unknown.  In these cases, lifespan analysis can be used to provide 
an estimate of the life of the product based on a particular failure mode. 
 
2.4 Lifespan Analysis 
Lifespan analysis performs testing on a product to analyze its expected working 
life and behavior over the course of that life.  Statistical lifespan analysis tests the life of a 
product by running at its intended standard operating conditions, or at much harsher 
conditions in an accelerated life test.  This purposely allows units to fail in controlled 
conditions, and then uses the data from those failures to fit an appropriate probability 
distribution over the life of the product.  That data can then be used to evaluate other 
useful reliability information about that product.  Existing data from such tests can be 
used to perform a Monte Carlo simulation, which can be used as a start to plan new tests 
for similar products [23].  These simulations use random inputs from a defined set and 
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run a deterministic calculation on them [24].  Using this method, the previous failure data 
determines the outcomes based on the random inputs, giving a simulated lifespan test.  
These tests, while useful, still contain uncertainty.  These uncertainties can be parametric 
where they come from finite test elements or subjective interpretation of the data, or 
modeling uncertainties where errors in modeling or approximation create uncertainty in 
the data [25]. 
While lifespan analysis provides a picture of the life of a system based on a single 
failure mode, there are often many potential failure modes in a new system that must be 
considered.  Combining lifespan analysis with other methods to determine the risk of 
failure can allow for a more thorough risk mitigation process. 
 
3 RISK MITIGATION IN CONCEPTUAL DESIGN 
By using existing failure models alongside risk analysis tools, a method for 
mitigating the potential failures of a new product can be realized.  This method involves 
applying RED to the functional model to determine the potential failure modes and 
corresponding functions have the greatest likelihood and consequence of occurrence.  
These function-failure mode pairs are then further analyzed through the means of existing 
failure models and lifespan analysis to provide a beginning point for further failure 
mitigation.   
During the conceptual phase of design, there are many possible forms that a 
product design can take.  While the components that make up the product are yet 
unknown, the actions the product must perform are known.  Performing a RED analysis 
on the system identifies potential failure areas in the system.  The actions and the 
  
11 
corresponding failure modes are ranked by consequence and likelihood into low, 
moderate, and high risk failures.  This initial analysis identifies the high risk areas of the 
product that should be focused on to minimize failure. 
Once these highest risk areas of the design are known, the components that 
correspond to those functions have to be evaluated against each other so that the 
component with the least risk can be selected for each.  The actions used in the RED 
analysis correspond to potential components used in the different concepts.  The potential 
components that fit the highest risk functions from RED are identified, as well as the 
failure modes that apply to those components.  Different components can perform the 
same actions as each other, yet may not fail by the same failure modes. 
Once the potential components that correspond to a given action and failure mode 
have been determined, a means to assess the failure modes of the different components is 
found, either in the form of an equation or statistical lifespan analysis.   
For many mechanical failure modes, there exist mathematical models for failure 
based on the geometry, loading, and properties of the component.  A literature review 
revealed many of the mechanical and electrical failure mode equations from the failure 
modes in the taxonomy.  From these modeling equations, variables were divided into 
design parameters that is, those parameters that can be altered by the designer, and 
situational, or those parameters dependant on the situation the system is in, and the 
designer has limited control over.  In these models, the design parameters are marked 
with a (D) and the situational parameters are marked with a (S).   
For example, “high cycle fatigue” can be modeled using the Stress Life Method, 
shown in Table 1 [26].  In this model, the experimentally determined material parameters 
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C and m and the stress intensity factor K were deemed design parameters as the designer 
can choose the material used in the design, as well as the geometry of the component.   
The number of cycles, N, as well as the crack growth, a, were deemed situational 
parameters as the number of cycles of operation and the rate of crack growth are usually 
design requirements, and cannot be altered by the designer.  These design parameters can 
be used as a starting point for selecting or designing new components.  While the exact 
details may not exist until later in the design, the basic concepts from the model can be 
used to help the designer rule out or create appropriate solutions to a function. 
Using this similar methodology, the design and situational parameters were 
determined for all of the found failure mode models.  Using these equations can help 
design the component so that it will not fail under operation, will last as long as needed, 
or determine if the component is not feasible to the product. A complete current listing of 
modeling equations used in this method is presented in Appendix A.   
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Table 1. Collection of Some Mechanical Failure Mode Models 











a = crack growth (S) 
C & m = material properties (D) 
K = Stress intensity factor (D) 















+ #' f (2N)
c  
ε = strain (S) 
! 
" f , b, εf, c = material constants 
(D) 
E = modulus of elasticity (D) 
N = number of cycles (S) 
Galling [27] 
! 
V = Klw / p V = volume lost (S) 
K = wear coefficient (D) 
l = sliding distance (D) 
w = normal load (S, D) 














 Pm = nominal contact pressure (S) 
! 
" YP = uniaxial yield point stress 
(D) 
W = load (S) 
Aa = apparent contact area (D) 
 
 
In certain instances, it is difficult for a single or set of mathematical equations to 
accurately model a failure mode.  Some, such as “creep” or “undercurrent,” are simply 
difficult to predict without testing.  Others, such as “fretting fatigue,” “corrosive wear,” 
and “gate oxide breakdown” do not yet have a model or have yet to validate any existing 
models [27, 28].  Finally, some such as “fretting corrosion” and “radiation damage” vary 
greatly depending on the material undergoing the failure, and lack a single unified model 
[27, 29].  In cases such as this, lifespan analysis can be used to help predict the overall 
lifespan or degradation rate of the failure mode.  
For this analysis, lifespan data regarding that component and failure mode can be 
used to simulate the behavior of that failure mode.  This data can be found for similar 
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products that have had lifespan testing performed on them for a given failure mode, and 
consist of a type of lifespan distribution function and the corresponding parameters (such 
as the Weibull distribution), or the means to calculate these values.   
Using this data, a Monte Carlo simulation can be run to give an idea of how the 
component behaved during a lifespan test.  This data can be used as a basis to compare 
the overall lifetimes of components and their probability of failure at a particular time in 
their life.  Based on the data from these models and the initial inclusion of RED, a 
component can be selected to give the product the minimum likelihood of failure as well 
as the desired length of life, to help eliminate the function-failure mode pairs of highest 
risk.  As a further benefit to using this analysis, if further detail is required or a significant 
change to the component has been made during design, the simulation results can be used 
as the starting point for performing a lifespan test, which can be carried out later in the 
design process.  In this way, historical data on a component can be used to predict its 
failure behavior for a given failure mode. 
 
4 CASE STUDY 
As an example of the application of this method, a case study of a wind turbine 
will be examined.  For the purpose of this example, we will look at the wind turbine 
during the conceptual phase of the design.  Since we are at the conceptual stage, the only 





Figure 1.  Functional Model of Wind Turbine 
 
Using the functional model, a list of functions is generated and used to run a RED 
analysis.  For this case study, the RED analysis returned fifty-six function-failure mode 
pairs.  These results point toward the functions and failure modes that have the highest 
consequence and likelihood of failure.  There was one high risk function-failure mode 
pair, “transfer mechanical energy fails due to high cycle fatigue,” and seven moderate 
risk function-failure mode pairs as shown below in Figure 2.  In the fever chart, the axes 
show the severity of the consequence and the likelihood, and the number in the cell is the 





Transfer Mechanical Energy fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (4, 4) 
Import Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Guide Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Export Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Transfer Mechanical energy fails due to Impact Fracture (5, 1) 
Regulate Mechanical energy fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 1) 
Regulate Mechanical energy fails due to Thermal Shock (5, 1) 
Transfer Mechanical energy fails due to Yielding (4, 2) 
 
Figure 2.  RED Results for Wind Turbine (Consequence, Likelihood) 
 
The current RED knowledge base is incomplete, and as such has no data on some 
failure modes, such as undercurrent.  While it is not the purpose of this paper, a well-
populated RED knowledge base would also include appropriate electrical failure modes 
as well.  The example of undercurrent used here was chosen as data for this failure mode 
is easily available. 
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Once this portion of the analysis is completed, the analysis follows two different 
paths, one for failure modes that can be modeled by existing mathematical models, and 
one for those that either have no existing model or are difficult to model.
 
4.1 Analysis Based on Failure Mode Model 
Once the potential failures of the turbine have been determined, a means of 
evaluating potential solutions by this failure mode must be found.  Of these function-
failure modes, the highest risk pair can be modeled using the “strain life method” to 
model the high-cycle fatigue.  This model, shown in Eq. (1), relates the strain, modulus of 
elasticity, and the number of cycles to the material properties.  Of the two models for 
high-cycle fatigue, this model is regarded as having the higher accuracy, and the better 










+ #' f (2N)
c
 (1) 
As shown in Table 1, for this model, the situational parameters are the strain, ε, 
and the number of cycles, N.  The design parameters are the modulus of elasticity, E, and 
the material properties σ’f, b, c, and ε’f.  For this particular instance, the strain and the 
number of cycles are set by the situation.  Whatever component that will be used to 
answer the function “transfer mechanical energy” will be dependent on the load it will 
experience and the number of cycles that are required for its active life.  To achieve those 
desired results, the material the component is made out of must be resistant to strain, 
possessing a balance of a high modulus of elasticity and strength.  When selecting or 




In current wind turbines, materials such as steel and aluminum are used in the 
drive train to transfer the mechanical energy from the blades to the generator.  To 
determine the most suitable material, the material properties are used to calculate the 
strain amplitude (Δε/2) for the different materials, for a given number of cycles.  For the 
purposes of the wind turbine, the components are designed for very long life, such as 
4x108 cycles of life.  The properties for 2024-T4 aluminum, 1018 steel, and 4142 
quenched steel and the resulting strain amplitudes are collected in Table 2 [30].  As can 
be seen, the strain amplitude for the 1018 steel is an order of magnitude smaller than the 
aluminum, as 1018 steel is a softer low carbon steel.  However, the hardness of the 4142 
steel compares better to the aluminum for this example.  For these three materials and 
these properties, the 4142 steel can withstand a higher strain for the same life, at high life 
spans as shown in Figure 3.  The 4142 steel would be the best choice in this case.  This 
method can be repeated for many more materials, in this same fashion, to select the 
material capable of handling the required load (strain) for the appropriate life. 
 







E 70430 MPa 207000 
MPa 
200000 MPa 
σ’f 764 MPa 882 MPa 2549 MPa 
B -.075 -.118 -.078 
C -.649 -.412 -.436 
ε’f .334 .16 .003 




Figure 3.  Comparison of Strain Amplitudes for 2024-T4 Aluminum, 1018 Steel, and 
4142 Quenched Steel 
 
4.2 Analysis Based on Lifespan Analysis
 
As a further example of the application of this method when no simple model 
exists, a case study of the action “store electrical energy” will be examined. For the 
turbine, one of the actions it must perform is “store electrical energy.”  After performing 
a RED analysis, one of the potential failure modes for this action is “undercurrent,” 
where the electrical current in a device drops to the point that performance is affected or 
halted. 
After the initial RED analysis, components that solve that action must be selected.  
For the action “store electrical energy” and the failure mode of “undercurrent,” there exist 
several possible components.  For this case study, three different batteries were 
considered as solutions to this action.  These three batteries were lithium ion, sodium 
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sulfur, and nickel hydrogen.  While it is understood that at least one of these batteries is 
unsuitable for the chosen application (lithium ion), these batteries were chosen as lifespan 
data was readily available for them.  Each of these batteries differ in chemical 
composition.  The failure mode for undercurrent has no simple model or mathematical 
formula to use for analysis, so a Monte Carlo simulation was performed using the data for 
the three batteries. 
For these simulations, data was required.  A literature search revealed that each of 
these three batteries can be modeled using a Weibull distribution with a positive shape 
parameter.   For this distribution, shown in Eq. 2, the shape parameter, β, and the scale 
parameter, η, were used.  These parameters correspond to the shape of the distribution 
and the overall size.  The scale parameter corresponds to the .632 quantile at which 
63.2% of the products have theoretically failed.  Using the different parameters for each 
battery, 200 data points corresponding to theoretical failed units were generated using the 
Monte Carlo method.  From that data, the cumulative distribution and hazard functions 
were created.  These represent the percent of units failed at a given time and the 
propensity that a unit will fail in the next instant, respectively.  For the hazard function, if 




















,t > 0    (2) 
The shape and scale factors for the lithium-ion batteries were 17.155 for β and 
505 for η, as discussed by Park, et al [31]. For sodium sulfur batteries, the shape 
parameter β was 5, and η was 87600, based on information from Weaver et al. [32]. The 
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nickel hydrogen batteries used a shape parameter β of 12 and a scale parameter η of 
46959, as stated by Simons, et al [33].  The scale parameter was obtained by converting 
the given mean of 45000 charge-discharge cycles using the Weibull mean involving the 
gamma function [23].   
The simulations show that these batteries would theoretically not fail by 
undercurrent until approximately 370 hours of constant use, and the last should 
theoretically fail at approximately 550 hours of use.  This constant use includes charging 
and discharging of the battery.  The hazard function ranges from 0 to .15 during those 
hours. The lifespan of the sodium sulfur batteries are much greater than those of lithium 
ion, with failures due to undercurrent beginning to show up at 30000 hours and the last 
failing at approximately 130000 hours, or a little under 15 years.  The hazard function 
ranges from 0 to .00027 across those ranges, much smaller than that of the lithium ion 
battery. The lifespan of the nickel hydrogen batteries are greater than those of lithium ion, 
but shorter than those of sodium sulfur.  The first failures begin to appear at around 
47000 hours, and the last fail at approximately 85000 hours, or just under 10 years.  The 
failure probabilities from the hazard function ranged from 0 to 0.0013, higher than that of 
sodium sulfur.  Comparisons for all three batteries’ cumulative distribution and hazard 





Figure 4.  Comparison of Cumulative Distribution Functions for Lithium Ion, Nickel 
Hydrogen, and Sodium Sulfur Batteries 
 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of Hazard Functions for Lithium Ion, Nickel Hydrogen, and 
Sodium Sulfur Batteries
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4.3 Results 
Based on these results, the appropriate component to limit failure can be selected.  
In the case of the function “transfer mechanical energy,” a material with a good balance 
of strength and elasticity should be selected to ensure the required number of cycles in 
the components life, for the given strain.  Once potential component have been selected, 
individual calculations can be carried out to determine the best possible selection using 
the model.   
In the case of “store electrical energy,” the lithium ion battery neither has the 
longest lifespan nor the lowest probability of failure in comparison to the other battery 
types.  As shown in Figure 4, the lithium ion batteries climb very high, very early on the 
chart.  While both sodium sulfur and nickel hydrogen batteries have a significantly 
fraction of failures for a given time than lithium ion over their entire lifetimes, they differ 
in the length of life and the fractions of units failed.  For the purpose of our example wind 
turbine, which needs batteries that will last longer in the field and have a lowest number 
of failures, the sodium sulfur batteries are the optimal choice.  The batteries should run 
failure free for about 4.6 years, and then require some monitoring for failed units from 
that point onward.  If further data is required later in the design process, this data can be 
used to design further analysis, such as accelerated lifespan testing, to further clarify the 
component and identify specific failure times for the version of the component that has 
been selected.  




As shown in the above example, the application of RED to determine potential 
failure modes and their models can help an engineer design a new product with a focus 
on reducing potential failures.  Whether the model of the failure is an understood 
equation or requires statistical lifespan analysis, this comprehensive method can help the 
novice engineer design new components as well as select from existing ones.  The use of 
existing failure mode models along with the RED analysis tool helps the designer to 
identify the important aspects of a component.  Similarly, by analyzing the lifespan 
distributions of different components, an appropriate low-risk component can be selected 
or designed for the product based on the expected life of the component or the probability 
of failure at a given time.  By using this method during the conceptual phase of design, 
new products with fewer potential failures can be designed. 
 
6 FUTURE WORK 
This work is the starting point for future risk mitigation methods.  A further 
analysis of available risk mitigation methods, as well as their costs and measures of 
success, would add to the design parameters and lifespan analysis, as well as the design 
of a tool to help novice engineers select the best method to use. 
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In order to ensure that risk mitigation strategies are properly communicated to and 
understood by those who would use them in future designs, a common language of risk 
mitigation should exist.  This paper focuses on a set of elements for describing risk 
mitigation strategies based on a linguistic analysis of the information such strategies must 
communicate to the design team.  Sample strategies are then decomposed into these 
attributes and evaluated using the Gricean cooperation principle, relevance theory, and 
functional analysis theories from the pragmatics sub-field of linguistics.  Using the 
deficiencies found from this analysis, a format for risk mitigation strategies using the six 
risk mitigation attributes is formulated. 
 
Keywords:  risk mitigation, mitigation strategies, linguistic analysis 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
  In industry, planning for potential failures is an important part of designing a 
product.  This failure mitigation takes the potential failures in a product, and creates 
measures to mitigate those risks, plan for any emergencies that may occur due to their 
failure, and control any residual risk that remains (Wang and Roush 2000).  The risk 
mitigation strategies that are created are important, and must convey their information so 
that it is not just understood by the engineers who develop them, but that there is no 
confusion as to who will execute them and how they are to be executed.  In particular, the 
mitigation strategies must clearly state the changes the strategy will make, and the effects 
those changes will have on the product, in addition to the failure being mitigated. 
When trying to communicate a mitigation strategy, proper communication is 
important.  For example, if a designer requires a change of the shaft diameter, the 
machinist needs to know what the new shaft diameter is, and in what dimensions.  In the 
other direction, if a machinist needs to make a change to manufacture the product, those 
responsible need to know what effect that change will have on the risk of the design.  If 
there is poor communication, the risk or its mitigation can be misunderstood and not dealt 
with efficiently, or wrongly, such as in the case of the Mars Climate Orbiter (NASA, 
1999).  Further, if two separate groups are trying to share strategies, they need to 
understand each other’s terms if either wishes to use the other’s strategies.  At the very 
least, additional time is required to process the strategy into a form it can be used.  If one 
wished to create a repository of such strategies, it would be next to impossible to search 
without proper terms and a language to organize and sort the database. 
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Currently, there is no common language for failure mitigation or its strategies 
known by the authors.  As failure mitigation is currently handled within a design group 
and primarily based on that group’s expert opinion, definitions of what is required for a 
risk mitigation strategy can very greatly between two different designers.  Further, unless 
the terms, such as the environmental or design changes, are understood between the 
design team creating the plan and the manufacturer or customer that will implement the 
plan, there can be confusion between the different groups.  Finally, without a common 
language, it becomes difficult to understand strategies used in the past, and determine if 
they are fit to use on current risks. 
In order to promote greater communication of risk mitigation strategies, as well as 
allow them to be rated in terms of quality, this work seeks to better understand what must 
be communicated in a risk mitigation strategy, as well as providing a means for 
evaluating current mitigation strategies based on what must be communicated.  It will 
begin with the identification of the important elements in a strategy. Using these 
elements, a linguistic analysis will be performed on several risk mitigation strategies to 
determine how well they communicate information.  These elements will give a means to 
evaluate how well a risk mitigation strategy communicates its information to others.  
Finally, these elements and evaluations will allow for links to be formed between failure 
analysis methods such as the Risk in Early Design method (RED) (Lough 2007) and 
failure mitigation, as well as show how mitigation strategies can be improved. 
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2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Risk Mitigation 
Risk mitigation is the process of removing, reducing, or transferring the risk in a 
system or product, as well as planning for unavoidable risks (Wang and Roush 2000).  
Risk mitigation develops risk mitigation strategies, which are then implemented on the 
product.   
There are several tools to aid in the construction of these strategies.  Cost-benefit 
analysis compares different choices based on their estimated or measured costs and 
benefits (Nas 1996).  The costs and benefits of a given choice are quantified, usually into 
a monetary value.  These values are then compared, and the best overall choice is 
selected based on those quantified costs and benefits.  This allows different strategies to 
be rated against each other and the most fit strategy to be put into place for a given risk. 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), while not a risk mitigation tool 
itself, often requires the use of risk mitigation during analysis.  FMEA collects and 
evaluates potential failures in a product by recording the occurrence, severity, and 
detection values.  In addition to the ratings, it also requires an action item to handle the 
failure.  Some versions also require recording a new occurrence, severity, and detection 
after implementing the action item (Department of Defense, 1949). 
Adaptive management creates a strategy or strategies and tests them by applying 
them to the situation, and adapting the strategy as time passes (Brody et al. 2009).  A 
successful strategy remains in place, while less successful strategies are changed to better 
answer the risk, or are replaced with entirely new strategies.  Adaptive management is a 
    
32 
real time risk mitigation tool, useful for the changing of risk mitigation strategies over the 
course of their lives, but less useful on a system still in the early part of design. 
The risk-based distributed allocation methodology (R-DRAM) focuses on the 
costs and benefits of risk mitigation across shareholders in a project, and determines the 
best spread of those resources to get the most benefit to the least cost with the lowest 
overall variance (Qiu et al. 2007). 
Similarly, the antiterrorism risk-based decision aid (ARDA) determines the best 
means to mitigate potential terrorist attacks based on their cost-benefit analysis, by 
determining what resources are at risk and by what means.  These are then evaluated 
based on the consequences and likelihood of the risk, and the costs saved by 
implementing the mitigation.  These are then ranked to give the best mitigations for a 
given set of risks (Dillon et al. 2009). 
While these tools exist to help designers determine the best ways to mitigate risks, 
they still rely on expert knowledge to generate the strategies, and have no consistent 
language between them.  Two different groups attempting to mitigate the same set of 
risks may come up with different mitigation strategies, with different costs and benefits 
and effects on a product or system.  In order to properly communicate these risk 
mitigation strategies, there needs to be some common language. 
 
2.2 Risk Communication Pragmatics 
The concept of using linguistic analysis to understand risk and how it is 
communicated is not new.  Grantham Lough et al (2009) used linguistic analysis to 
examine risk elements, which are phrases that describe the failure, its scenario, causes, 
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and effects, as well as any issues or concerns related to that failure (Wie et al. 2005).  
Linguistic analysis was used to break these risk elements into attributes, such as 
Performance Parameters, Design Parameters, and Noise Parameters.  These attributes 
were then used to evaluate 117 risk elements based on three theories of pragmatics, and 
then suggest a common method to report risk elements to capture as much information as 
possible (Grantham Lough et al. 2009). 
Similar to the analysis of risk elements performed by Grantham Lough et al, when 
communicating risk mitigation strategies, the context of the strategy is important.  This 
context refers to the details surrounding the strategy and how it applies to a product of 
system, such as the risk it is meant to mitigate or a change in a shaft diameter being made 
to the product.  This focus on the context of a risk mitigation strategy lends itself to the 
sub-field of linguistics termed pragmatics, which focuses entirely on how statements are 
used to communicate and how they relate to the context of the discussion (Barsalou 1992, 
Wilson and Keil 1999).  An analysis based on the pragmatics of communicating risk 
mitigation is appropriate as the focus of this work is on what is being communicated and 
how that communication can be improved. 
This analysis will be based on three theories of pragmatics.  Each of these theories 
gives certain conditions, and state that communication is successful when those 
conditions are met (Green 1996).  These theories will then be applied to the 
communication of risk mitigation. 
 
2.2.1 Gricean Cooperation Principle.  The Gricean cooperation principle 
consists of four maxims that, unless the goal of the communication is to misinform, 
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should be followed for communication to be effective (Barsalou 1992).  These four 
maxims describe cooperative interaction: 
Quantity: A statement should be as informative as possible, but not more 
than necessary 
Relevance: A statement should be relevant to the goals of the conversation 
Quality: A statement should be true and be based on sound evidence 
Manner: A statement should be clear, unambiguous, and orderly 
As a risk mitigation strategy is communicating correct information and not trying 
to hide the information, it should follow all four maxims. 
 
2.2.2 Functional Approach.  The functional approach states that communication 
serves seven different functions (Green 1996).  The instrumental function deals with 
satisfying needs, such as acquiring of goods and services.  The regulatory function deals 
with the control of others, such as giving commands and orders to another person.  The 
interactional function establishes interactions with others, such as giving a greeting or 
calling a person’s name.  The personal function applies to expressing awareness of one’s 
self, such as a person’s desires, feelings, and interests.  The heuristic function is used to 
find out about the world, such as asking why the sky is blue.  The imaginative function 
creates an imaginary environment, such as writing a fictional story.  Finally, the 
informative function is used to convey information about the world, which must be done 
with language. 
In the case of risk mitigation, the regulatory and informative functions are the 
most important.  A risk mitigation strategy is giving a command or order to change a 
    
35 
product in some fashion that should be understood and followed.  In addition, the strategy 
has to relate important information to those who need to enact it. 
 
2.2.3 Relevance Theory.  Relevance theory operates on two principles:  that a 
statement creates positive cognitive effects and requires less processing effort (Wilson 
and Keil 1999). 
If all other things are held equal, a statement that creates greater positive cognitive 
effects will be more relevant to the conversation.  These cognitive effects can take the 
form of supporting existing information, contradicting existing assumptions, or 
interacting with existing information to create new conclusions.  The more of these 
positive effects the statement has, the more relevant it is. 
Similarly, if everything else is equal, then the statement with the lowest 
processing effort is the most relevant.  This processing effort is the amount of effort that 
must be put into interpreting and understanding the statement, such as recalling relevant 
memory and inferences that must be created (Green 1996). 
This implies that the information in a risk mitigation strategy should increase the 
understanding of the product and how the risk can be eliminated, and should be clear 
enough to understand with minimal effort. 
 
3 RISK MITIGATION STRATEGY ATTRIBUTES 
The dependence on expert opinion and knowledge for risk mitigation can create 
very informal risk mitigation strategies that are often difficult to understand or 
    
36 
implement.  As the beginning of this research approach, risk mitigation strategies are 
investigated, and a set of risk mitigation attributes is developed. 
 
3.1 Risk Mitigation Strategy Examples 
Presented here are some of the risk mitigation strategies used in the analysis.  
These risk mitigation strategies are taken from the engine nacelle data for the Boeing 777 
aircraft, as well as published general and case specific strategies from Solutions to 
Equipment Failure (Timmons 1999), and came in the form of a series of tables or a 
written description of the mitigation strategy.  These data were selected both because of 
the different types of solutions that were generated, as well as its accessibility.  These 
represent the different mitigation strategies, both general and taken from case studies, 
which were broken down into risk attributes.  A complete listing of all mitigation 
strategies included in this analysis are shown in Appendix B. 
Example Strategy #1:  Corrosion protection of aluminum aircraft parts by coating 
with pure aluminum. 
This strategy identifies a general failure mode, corrosion, and gives a design 
change by coating an aluminum alloy with pure aluminum to resist that failure mode.  
However, it does not discuss whether this will reduce likelihood or consequence of 
failure. 
Example Strategy #2:  Reduce pitting corrosion by heat treatment of component 
to softer condition. 
Again, this strategy identifies the failure mode and the design parameters affected: 
the hardness of the material.  Again, no mention of how this strategy reduces the risk of 
the failure is given. 
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Example Strategy # 3:  Reaming bolt holes and using interference-fit bushings. 
In this example, no mention of a failure mode is given, just a design change and 
no other mention of the design parameters affected or the affect on the risk of this failure 
mode. 
Example Strategy # 4:  Better care in assembly to prevent dents and stress 
concentrations. 
This example gives an environmental change (the environment the product is 
being assembled in) but no information on which failure modes this is intended to 
mitigate, but does give a parameter that is affected, stress concentrations. 
 
3.2 Risk Mitigation Strategy Attributes 
Risk mitigation strategies share much in common with the risk elements they 
mitigate.  In order to develop a set of risk mitigation attributes, several definitions from 
Glutch (1994), Kaplan and Gerrick (1981), Grantham et al. (2009), and Krus and 
Grantham (2010) were used to map the risk elements to corresponding risk mitigation 
attributes. 
Kaplan and Gerrick describe risk in the three terms of the scenario of the failure, 
the likelihood of the failure, and its consequences (1981).  For risk mitigation, 
comparable attributes would be the failure mode mitigated and the design parameters it 
corresponds to, which is the scenario the mitigation strategy applies to.  The likelihood 
and consequence values correspond to the reductions in the likelihood and consequence 
in the product from applying the mitigation strategy. 
Similarly, Glutch defines risk in terms of the context, probability of failure, and 
the impact of the failure (1994).  The context surrounding the strategy links to the failure 
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mode and the design parameters, which describe the mitigation strategy.  As above, 
probability maps to the change in the likelihood of risk, and the impact maps to a change 
in the consequence of failure.  
Grantham et al. define a risk element with performance (a measurable indicator of 
the system’s performance), design (parameters of the system that are defined by the 
design), and noise parameters (parameters that are beyond the control of the designer), as 
well as the failure mode and failure scenario (2009).  The performance parameter can be 
mapped to the likelihood and consequence changes in a product, as those show the 
improvement in performance.  The design parameters represent those parameters that a 
designer can change, and links to the changes a mitigation strategy call for.  The noise 
parameters are parameters beyond the control of the designer, and can be equated to the 
environmental changes called for by a mitigation strategy.  The failure mode is the same 
in both cases, being the failure mode that happens and the strategy intends to mitigate.  
Finally the failure scenario corresponds to the mitigation used in the strategy to limit the 
risk. 
Krus and Grantham (2010) recommended looking at risk mitigation strategies by 
relating them to the parameters of the failure mode models.  These design and situational 
parameters in the failure mode models related to the design and environmental changes 
that could be made to the system or its surroundings.   
By mapping these four approaches to codifying risk elements, six risk mitigation 
elements can be derived.  The first of those is the Failure Mode to be mitigated.  This 
attribute covers the exact failure the mitigation strategy is to affect, such as high cycle 
fatigue, galling, or undercurrent.  This attribute is important for understanding when a 
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strategy can be applied, and is a direct mapping of the failure mode discussed by 
Grantham et al. 
The next parameter is Design Change.  This is a change made to the design of a 
product with the intent of reducing a risk, and can be viewed as the product being 
physically different after the change is applied.  These changes are the aspects of a design 
that the designer has a direct control over, such as a change in the shaft diameter, or the 
selection of a high strength steel to manufacture that same shaft.  This is one of two 
attributes that tracks the parameters a mitigation strategy affects, and map to the scenario 
or context of the strategy. 
Similarly, an Environment Change is a change made to the environment the 
product operates in or how it is manufactured, with the intent of reducing a risk.  These 
are changes made to the environment that affect the product indirectly and do not 
physically change the design of the product, such as an operator instruction not to 
overpressure a tank, or overload a bridge.  Like the Design change, this attribute tracks 
the parameters a mitigation strategy affects, and is a mapping of the context or scenario. 
Next, the Likelihood Change is a change in the likelihood of the risk brought on 
by a mitigation strategy.  These are the estimated or measured changes in the likelihood 
of a failure mode occurring because of the mitigation strategy.  An example of this 
attribute would be a reduction in the likelihood of failure by 2% due to the change in the 
shaft diameter.  This attribute is the first of two that tracks the performance of a 
mitigation strategy, and shows the reduction in risk that such a strategy seeks to 
accomplish.  This maps to the consequence, impact, or performance of a risk element. 
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Like the Likelihood Change, Consequence Change is a change in the 
consequences of a risk brought on by a mitigation strategy. These are the estimated or 
measured changes in the consequence of a failure mode occurring because of the 
mitigation strategy.  This attribute, too, tracks the performance of the mitigation strategy 
and demonstrates the reduction in risk.  As Likelihood Change, this maps to the 
consequence, impact, or performance of a risk element. 
The final attribute is the Design Parameter.  This attribute covers the exact 
parameters that relate to the mitigation strategy and failure mode.  These parameters are 
such things as the geometry of the product, its material fatigue properties, or its resistance 
to corrosion.  This identifies the exact parameters that relate the failure mode and the 
mitigation strategy to the product.  A strategy can have design parameters, and no design 
change.  The design parameters are the physical aspects of the design that are affected by 
the strategy and failure mode.  This attribute maps to the design and noise parameters, as 
well as the context or scenario. 
Shown below in Table 1 is a summary of the six risk mitigation attributes, and 
where they were derived from, and why they are important to the communication of risk 
mitigation strategies. 
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Table 1.  Risk Mitigation Strategy Attributes 
!"#$%&'() *(+,$-., /01234( 5(6(#(,7( 89:;
Failure Mode (F)
The failure mode the 
mitigation strategy is 
meant to mitigate.
High Cycle Fatigue, 
Galling, Undercurrent
Grantham, et al, 
2009; Kaplan and 
Garrick, 1981; Glutch, 
1994
The exact failure mitigated is important.  This also describes the 
situation the mitigation strategy is applicable.  Tracks what 
strategy is supposed to mitigate.
Design Change (D)
A change that is made 
to the design of the 
product, with the 
intent of reducing the 
risk.
A change in the shaft 
diameter.
Krus and Grantham, 
2009;  Grantham, et 
al, 2009
Many mitigation strategies recommend changing the design of 
the product to achieve the desired goal.  Variables from failure 
mode equations can be classified as design variables.  Tracks 
the parameters the strategy affects.
Environment Change (E)
A change that is made 
to the environment 
the product operates 
in, with the intent of 
reducing the risk.
An operator instruction 
to not load the product 
more and 500 lbs.
Krus and Grantham, 
2009; Grantham, et 
al, 2009
Many mitigation strategies recommend changing the way or 
how a product is used to achieve the desired goal.  Variables 
from failure mode equations can be classified as environmental 
variables, that pertain to the environment the product works in.  
Tracks parameters the strategy affects.
Likelihood Change (L)
A change in the 
likelihood of the failure 
mode caused by the 
mitigation strategy.
Develop plan for 
concept design 
reduces Likelihood by 
2%.
Boeing 777 Engine 
Nacelle Design Data; 
Grantham, et al, 
2009; Glutch1994; 
Kaplan and Garrick, 
1981
One of the major components of risk analysis is the likelihood of 
the failure.  The likelihood reduction should be important to the 
mitigation strategy.  Tracks the performance of the strategy.  
Boeing uses percent change in likelihood from a given change.
Consequence Change (C)
A change in the 
consequence of the 
failure mode caused 






Boeing 777 Engine 
Nacelle Design Data; 
Grantham, et al, 
2009; Glutch1994; 
Kaplan and Garrick, 
1981
One of the major components of risk analysis is the 
consequence of the failure.  The consequence reduction should 
be important to the mitigation strategy. Tracks the performance 
of the strategy.  Boeing uses percent change in consequence for 
a given change.
Design Parameters (DP)
The parameters of the 
design that are 
affected by the failure 
mode.
The shaft diameter, 
the material properties 
of the shaft, the 
function of the 
component.
Grantham, et al, 
2009; Kaplan and 
Garrick, 1981; Glutch, 
1994
These parameters are the parts of the design that correspond to 
the failure mode, and that the Design Changes can impact.  
Tracks where changes can be made in the product.
 
4 PRAGMATICS ANALYSIS OF RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
In carrying out this analysis, two assumptions must be made.  First, it must be 
assumed that the elicitation, discussion, and consideration of risk mitigation are all 
subject to the principles of pragmatics and that risk mitigation should be addressed in a 
manner consistent with these principles.  The second assumption is that the risk 
mitigation attributes described in Section 3.2 are one potential valid solution toward 
specifying the context of risk mitigation, which is important to the discussion of risk 
mitigation.  This second assumption demonstrates that this is only one potential way of 
looking at evaluating risk mitigation strategies, and there may be others.  That is, these 
attributes are just one way to define mitigation strategies; there may be other, different, 
yet still valid sets of attributes that can define mitigation strategies. 
What follows is the procedure and the pragmatic specific analyses that will be 
applied to the collected risk mitigation strategies. 
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4.1 Pragmatics Analysis Procedure 
The sample risk mitigation strategies are decomposed into the risk mitigation 
attributes expressed above.  These attributes will then be used to analyze the sample 
strategies using the three pragmatics approaches discussed in Section 2.2: the Gricean 
Cooperation Principle, Functional Analysis, and Relevance theory.  This approach can be 
broken down into four steps: 
Step 1:  Relate each theory to the risk mitigation attributes.  Each maxim is 
written in terms of general conversation, and needs to be transformed into one 
that deals specifically with risk mitigation.  For this step, each mitigation 
strategy is broken down into the risk mitigation attributes by a group of 
experts (in the case of this paper, the authors, both of whom have a 
background in risk analysis and risk mitigation). This corresponds to the 
mappings column in Table 2, which show which attributes are related to given 
questions. 
Step 2:  Derive specific questions to relate the linguistic theories to the risk 
mitigation strategies.  The maxims will be broken down into questions 
pertaining to the attributes of a given risk mitigation strategy.  These questions 
will be used to evaluate if the strategy meets a particular maxim. These relate 
to the Question and Property Specific Question columns in Table 2. 
Step 3:  Derive logical relationships between the attributes and the maxims to 
determine if the criteria are satisfied.  The relationship between the attributes 
and the questions pertaining to the maxims will be transformed into logical 
relations.  A true value from the relation will mean that the attribute validates 
    
43 
that criterion. These correspond to the Logical Relationship column of Table 
2. 
Step 4: Evaluate each mitigation strategy.  The mitigation strategies will then be 
evaluated using the attributes they were broken down into and the logical 
relations developed in step 3. 
The specific questions for the given linguistic theories are presented in the 
following sections. 
 
4.1.1 Gricean Cooperation Principle.  For the maxim of quantity, the mitigation 
strategy should be informative and have only what is required.  This translates to two 
questions: is the strategy informative, and does it only have what is required, as shown in 
Table 2.  In terms of the mitigation attributes, an informative strategy should present the 
failure mode mitigated, the design or environment change, and the design parameters 
affected, which is the minimum amount of information needed to perform and evaluate 
the strategy.  The second question states that the strategy should only deal with this 
failure mode(s) and not others; that is, this strategy should only relate to this failure and 
not have information about others.  To answer this, the strategy should contain the failure 
mode(s) and design parameters specific to that strategy and contain no extraneous 
information; that is, design parameters or failure modes that don’t relate to the mitigation 
strategy.  The logical relationships that follow from these property specific questions are 
shown in the last column of Table 2.  If these relations are both true, then the quantity 
maxim is true. 
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For relevance, the strategy should pertain to the failure mode and show that it will 
have an effect.  In the terms of risk mitigation, the strategy should contain a failure mode 
it affects, a change in the likelihood or consequence of the failure.  Containing the failure 
mode demonstrates the strategy being important to the topic, and the likelihood or 
consequence changes denote that this strategy will mitigate the risk, and have an effect on 
the failure mode.  If the strategy contains at least one of those attributes, it is relevant to 
the conversation. 
The quality maxim should address if the strategy can affect the risk and the 
product itself.  These break down into three conditions.  If the strategy contains a 
likelihood or consequence change, then the strategy will have an effect on the risk.  
Similarly, if it has a design or environment change, as well as corresponding design 
parameters, the strategy will affect the product.  Finally, those design parameters must 
relate to the failure mode being mitigated in order to truly affect the risk.  If all three 
conditions are met, then the quality maxim is met. 
Finally, for the maxim of manner, the strategy should be clear and unambiguous.  
For clarity, the strategy must contain at least the failure mode to be mitigated and the 
design parameters that are affected by the changes.  These are the items that must be 
present to understand what the strategy mitigates and how it does it.  For the strategy to 
be unambiguous, it should report the likelihood or consequence change, the design or 
environment change, and the design parameters affected.  These show what the 
mitigation strategy affects.  If these are met, then the maxim of manner is satisfied. 
 
4.1.2 Functional Analysis.  For the regulatory function, the strategy should 
designate where the changes are to be made and give clear orders to follow.  For this to 
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be understood, the changes to the design or environment and the design parameters must 
relate to the failure mode.  Likewise, to prevent confusions and give clear orders, the 
design and environment changes must relate correctly to the design parameters.  If both 
of these conditions are met, the strategy performs the regulatory function. 
To answer the informative function, the strategy should give as much information 
as possible about the risk and how it will be mitigated.  This can be accomplished if the 
strategy contains the failure mode to be mitigated, the design or environment changes that 
should be made to answer that failure mode, the likelihood or consequence changes that 
result from the mitigation, and the design parameters that will be affected.  If all four of 
those attributes are accounted for, the strategy completes the informative function. 
 
4.1.3 Relevance Theory.  The positive cognitive effects should be answered by 
the strategy including as much information as is possible.  To answer this category, as 
many of the possible attributes as possible should be included in the strategy.  As more 
attributes are included, more conclusions about the strategy can be reached, and the exact 
information becomes clearer.  The more of these elements reported, the better the strategy 
meets this criterion.  This criterion is independent of the actual word length of the 
strategy, and only concerns the attributes present in the strategy itself. 
From the processing effort portion, the strategy needs to have at least enough data 
to mitigate the risk.  To do this, the strategy needs to meet the minimum amount of 
information about the mitigation.  To meet this criterion, then, more than half of the 
potential attributes should be present in a strategy. 
Shown in Table 2 is a summary of the criteria derived from these three 
approaches, which attributes correspond to each criteria, the exact question to be 
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answered, and the appropriate logical relationship posed by the question.  These will be 
used to perform the pragmatics analysis on the collected risk mitigation strategies. 
 
Table 2.  Risk Mitigation Strategy Categories 
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4.1.4 Example of Mitigation Strategy Evaluation.  In this section, the step-by-
step evaluation is shown for one of the mitigation strategies, “Better processing controls 
during etching and plating procedures to reduce potential pits chances of affecting 
material properties.”  First, the individual parameters contained within the strategy must 
be identified.  When this strategy was collected from (Timmons, 1999), the strategy was 
cited as a solution for the failure mode fatigue, fulfilling the Failure Mode attribute.  As 
the change would affect the manufacturing process, but not the design, it was identified 
as an Environment Change.  However, no Design Change was reported, as no overall 
change was made to the design of the product.  In the literature, no information was given 
regarding whether this change would affect the likelihood or consequence of change.  
However, the design parameters of material fatigue properties and the crack size were 
listed.  So, for this mitigation strategy, a Failure Mode, Environment Change, and Design 
Parameters were identified, while the other three attributes were not. 
After the attributes were collected, they were evaluated against the logical 
relations as shown in Table 2.  For the Gricean Cooperation Principle, there are four 
maxims divided into seven relations.  The first of those is Quantity, with two relations.  
The first asks if there is an adequate quantity of information, and contains a Failure 
Mode, either a Design or Environment Change, and Design Parameters.  “Better 
processing controls” has three of these parameters (with the Environment Change 
fulfilling the OR condition), and is true for this first question.  The second asks if the if 
the Failure Mode and Design Parameters are specific to this strategy.  The Design 
Parameters relate to the Failure Mode, and are specific to this strategy, and so the second 
question is true.  As both are true, this strategy satisfies the Quantity Maxim. 
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This process can be repeated for all of the other relations.  For this given strategy, 
Relevance is false (no Likelihood or Consequence Changes), as is Quality (Q1 is false, 
again due to no Likelihood of Consequence, but Q2 is true as the strategy has an 
environment change).  Manner is similarly false (M1is true, but M2 is false).  The exact 
same procedure is carried out for Functional Analysis, with Regulatory being true, and 
Informative being false.  Relevance is slightly different, as the Positive Cognitive Effect 
is a count of the number of attributes identified, which is three in this case.  This is not 
enough for the Processing Effort to be true. 
This procedure was repeated for all fifty of the collected mitigation strategies, 
with the results shown in the following section. 
 
4.2 Analysis Results 
The mitigation strategies used covered two different varieties:  general strategies 
used to combat a class of failures, and specific strategies taken from the recommended 
actions of case studies.  Presented here are the results of the analysis, demonstrating the 
variable nature of these mitigation strategies. 
 
4.2.1 Gricean Cooperation Principle.  Each strategy was subjected to the logical 
relationships presented in Table 2.  If a relationship tested true, then that portion of the 
maxim was satisfied.  If all questions were true, then the maxim was satisfied.  The 
results of the Gricean analysis are shown in Figure 1.  This figure shows that the maxim 
most satisfied is quality, followed by quantity, relevance, and manner.  By examining the 
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exact results for each portion of these maxims, a better understanding of what is missing 
can be acquired. 
For the maxim of quantity, two questions were asked.  The first asked if the 
strategy was informative, and checked if the strategy reported the failure mode, a design 
or environmental change, and the design parameters affected by the failure.  23 of the 50 
examined mitigation strategies met this criterion.  The second question asked if the 
strategy contained only the information required to mitigate that risk.  This strategy 
required that the design parameters and the failure mode appear only in this strategy.  19 
of the examined strategies met this criterion.  However, only 16 of the strategies shared 
these two criteria and met the quantity maxim.  These results are shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Gricean Mitigation Strategy Analysis 
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Figure 2.  Gricean Mitigation Strategy Analysis – Quantity 
 
The quality maxim also had two questions.  The first question asked if the 
strategy could reduce the risk, and checked if there was a likelihood or consequence 
change reported.  Over half the elements analyzed, 27, met this criterion.  The second 
question was the most successfully met of the Gricean questions.  This asked if the 
strategy could change the product, or its environment.  35 of the strategies met this 
criterion.  Again, there was less overlap between these two questions, with only 21 
strategies meeting both and satisfying the quality maxim.  These results are shown in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Gricean Mitigation Strategy Analysis – Quality 
 
For the maxim of manner, the first question asked if the question was clear, and 
possessed a failure mode and the design parameters it affected.  Just over half, 26, of the 
strategies met this.  The second asked if the strategy was unambiguous, and had a change 
either in design or environment, the affect that change had to the likelihood or 
consequence, and the design parameters affected.  This criterion had only 15 of the 
strategies meet it successfully.  Much like the quality maxim, the manner maxim had only 
a small overlap between these two questions, with only 10 strategies shared between 
them.  These results are shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Gricean Mitigation Strategy Analysis – Manner 
 
Overall, only 5 of the 50 mitigation strategies met all four maxims.  Of those, 2 
were from the Boeing strategies, and 3 were from the general strategies.  None of the case 
study mitigation strategies met all four maxims.  The most likely cause of this is that 
none of the case study samples possessed likelihood and consequence change attributes. 
 
4.2.2 Functional Analysis.  For the functional analysis portion, the mitigation 
strategies were subjected to the logical relationships presented into Table 2.  If the 
relationship tested true, then the strategy met the requirements for that function.  The 
results of the analysis are shown in Figure 5.  Similar to the Gricean analysis, what 
follows is the individual breakdown of each of the two functions. 
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Figure 5.  Functional Mitigation Strategy Analysis 
 
For the regulatory function, there were two questions.  These questions, does the 
mitigation strategy designate where the changes are to be made, and does it give clear 
orders.  Both of these questions can be linked to the same logical relationship, asking is 
the strategy contained the Design Change and Design Parameters or the Environmental 
Change.  For this relationship, 35 of the 50 strategies met this requirement; the most of 
any requirement save for the second quality question, which overlapped with this 
requirement. 
The informative function asked that the mitigation strategy contained the failure 
mode, either a design or environmental change, either likelihood or consequence change, 
and the design parameters.  10 of the 50 strategies met this requirement.  Those 10 
strategies that met the informative function also met the Gricean maxims, as well as the 
regulatory function. 
 
4.2.3 Relevance Theory.  The relevance theory results are different from the 
other 2 analysis methods in that the first of the two questions performs a count of the 
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number of attributes that each strategy contained.  This number of elements shows how 
much positive cognitive effect the strategy can create.  Figure 6 shows the breakdown of 
the mitigation strategies by number of attributes shown.  Most strategies contained either 
2 or 3 of the attributes, while only 26% had 4 or more attributes. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Relevance Mitigation Strategy Analysis – Positive Cognitive Effects 
 
The second requirement, processing effort, required that the mitigation strategy 
contain at least 4 of the 6 attributes, that is, over half.  As mentioned above, only 26% of 
the strategies met this criterion.   
 
5 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Again, it is important to remember that all of the following conclusions are based 
on two assumptions.  All of the discussion of risk mitigation and how those risk 
mitigation strategies are used is subject to the principles of pragmatics, and should be 
addressed in a manner consistent with those same principles.   In addition, the presented 
risk mitigation attributes are one potential solution to showing the context of a risk 
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mitigation strategy.  These two assumptions allow this analysis to show how well these 
mitigation strategies account for the attributes, and how well they conform to the 
principles of pragmatics. 
The three principles of pragmatics used here each provide a different view of how 
the mitigation strategies are communicated.  Throughout, two particular mitigation 
strategies, “corrosion protection of steel with cadmium” and “better manufacturing 
controls to remove fluids after hydrostatic testing,” will be examined to show why they 
did or did not meet a particular criterion. 
The Gricean Cooperation Principle analysis showed that the quantity maxim was 
met by 32% of the strategies.  These strategies were informative, but only enough to deal 
with their mitigation strategy and no others.  Strategies that met this maxim, such as 
“using fail-safe designs such as crack stoppers” possessed failure modes and design 
parameters, such as fatigue and material toughness, while those that didn’t, such as 
“barrier coating with an insulating material” lacked one of those categories, such as the 
design parameters.  For the two examples, “plating the steel with cadmium” contained the 
failure mode corrosion, gave the design change plate the steel with cadmium, and listed 
the material properties of the two materials as the design parameters affected.  “Better 
manufacturing controls” listed the failure mode stress corrosion and the environment 
change of increasing the controls on the product’s manufacture but did not list any 
design parameters affected by the failure mode or changes, causing it to not meet the 
criterion.  For the same reason (“cadmium plating” gave design parameters and “better 
manufacturing controls” did not), the second quantity criteria went the same way.  
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“Better manufacturing controls” could have been improved by the addition of design 
parameters, such as what controls could be implemented. 
Relevance was met by only 24% of the strategies.  Only those were relevant to 
their failure mode, showing that there was an identified change in the likelihood or 
consequence of the risk; again, “fail-safe design” and “crack stopper” met this criterion, 
whereas “preparing a hole by cold-working and using a split sleeve” did not, as it lacked 
both a likelihood and consequence change.  The “cadmium plating” strategy met this 
criterion by having both the failure mode, and explaining that such a strategy would 
reduce the likelihood of the failure by using a much more corrosion resistant material.  
“Better manufacturing controls” had a failure mode listed, but no change to either the 
likelihood or the consequence was given, causing it to not meet the criterion.  Stating that 
the controls would reduce the likelihood of risk would have made the strategy pass. 
42% of the strategies met the quality maxim, and thus gave true and sound 
information on the mitigation and the effects it would have.  “Plating of high strength 
steels with cadmium to resist corrosion” passed this maxim, by having a design change 
and the design parameters the failure mode affected, while “fail-safe methods focused on 
multiple redundant parts” did not, because while it had a design change, it did not have 
design parameters.  The “cadmium plating” here, as above, gave a likelihood change, 
showing it can reduce the risk, and by having a design change and design parameters 
showed that the strategy could affect the device.  “Better manufacturing controls” lack a 
likelihood or consequence change, failing the first criterion, but meets the second 
criterion, by giving an environment change.  Again, stating that the controls would reduce 
the likelihood of risk would have met this criterion. 
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Finally, manner only had 20% of the strategies meet its requirements of being 
clear, unambiguous, and orderly.  “Making fail-safe designs and crack stoppers” met 
these criteria, as it contained all the attributes except a consequence change.  In the other 
hand, “fail-safe methods of using redundant elements” was missing the design parameters 
affected, and thus did not adequately answer either question.  “Cadmium plating” passed 
the first criterion, having both the failure mode and design parameters, while “better 
manufacturing controls” lack the design parameters, making it less clear as to where these 
controls should be used.  The second criterion was also met by “cadmium plating,” as it 
contained a design change, likelihood change, and design parameters, showing a very 
unambiguous strategy.  As the “better manufacturing controls” lacked the design 
parameters and a likelihood or consequence change, it did not meet this criterion.  Of all 
the strategies, only 10% met all four maxims, being informative, relevant, true, and clear.  
To have “better manufacturing controls” meet all four maxims, the likelihood change it 
would cause and the design parameters the failure mode and environment change affect 
would have to be stated. 
The functional analysis results were a little different.  The regulatory function had 
the best results of any of the criteria listed, at 70% of the mitigation strategies.  This 
implies that for these mitigation strategies, they can communicate orders to control others 
well, by demonstrating where changes are to be made and giving clear orders.  Virtually 
all of the Boeing strategies met these criteria, possessing both design parameters and 
design changes, or an environment change.  Three quarters of the case studies, such as 
barrier coating with an insulating material, lacked those same design parameters or 
environmental changes.  “Cadmium plating” and “better manufacturing controls” both 
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met the regulatory function, as both had either a design change and design parameters, or 
an environmental change. 
The informative function, on the other hand, only had 20% of the strategies meet 
its requirements.  “Coating high strength steel with cadmium” did meet this requirement, 
possessing a failure mode, the design parameters affected, a likelihood change, and a 
design change.  In the case of the case studies, none had any likelihood or consequence 
changes stated, making it impossible for them to meet this function.  This means that 
while these strategies can give clear orders, those orders do not successfully convey 
information about those orders.  “Cadmium plating” passed as it contained all four asked 
for set of attributes (a failure mode, a design change, a likelihood change, and design 
parameters).  “Better manufacturing controls” failed because it lacked the design 
parameters and the likelihood or consequence changes.  Again, a likelihood change and 
design parameters would have caused “Better manufacturing controls” to satisfy both 
functional criteria. 
The relevance theory results show a large number of the strategies, 74% had three 
or less attributes.  Of the remaining, only a single strategy, “performing conformity and 
safety tests,” had all six attributes.  For these, the higher the number of attributes 
contained, the more positive cognitive effects can be generated and the more relevant a 
strategy is to the mitigation of the risk.  Those same 74% did not meet the second 
requirement, by having half or less of the potential attributes.  This means that for most of 
these strategies, an overly large amount of processing power is required to fill in the 
missing information, making them less relevant to the mitigation.  “Cadmium plating” 
contained 4 attributes, and “better manufacturing controls” contained only 2.  This lack of 
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information makes it difficult to reach the same kinds of conclusions as “cadmium 
plating,” and requires more effort to make those conclusions. 
Based on these conclusions, risk mitigation strategies tend to be missing 
important pieces of information, most often the effects of implementing the strategies 
(Likelihood and Consequence Changes).  Almost every single strategy had either a 
Design or Environment Change, as those changes are the core of the strategy.  The 
supporting details, such as the Failure Mode they addressed or the corresponding Design 
Parameters, as well as the above Likelihood and Consequence changes tended to be the 
missing attributes. 
These supporting pieces of data contain very useful information for a designer 
that would aid in the risk mitigation process.  These attributes can lead the designer 
directly to mitigation strategies tailored for a given risk, and provide how effective that 
strategy will be.  By not including those data, a designer has to determine the missing 
attributes on their own, and must sacrifice time to evaluate the best potential strategy.  By 
having the missing attributes, a designer can decrease the amount of time required to 
evaluate and select the best possible mitigation strategy. 
It should be mentioned that this is only one potential interpretation of the 
principles of pragmatics.  A different interpretation of these principles could lead to 
different results, which is a possible source of error in this work.  Further, each of the 
three theories is separate from the others, explaining why the relations for some of the 
maxims are the same. However, despite the three different approaches, they agree that 
these risk mitigation strategies clearly do not cover the attributes that are assumed to be 
important to the discussion of risk mitigation. 
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To rectify this problem, the consistency and descriptiveness of these mitigation 
strategies should be improved by adopting a format that requires specific attributes to be 
reported in a risk mitigation strategy.  This format would remove inconsistencies between 
different groups of engineers, and allow different mitigation strategies to give the same 
level of information as any other.  An example for the “cadmium plating” mitigation 
strategy is shown in Figure 7.  It should be mentioned that in this format, the strategy can 
use either a likelihood or consequence change, or both.  Similarly, it can contain either a 
design or environment change, or both.  At a minimum, the strategy should contain at 
least 4 of the 6 attributes, consisting of the failure mode, design parameters, at least one 
design or environment change, and at least one likelihood or consequence change. 
 
Corrosion that affects steels is mitigated by plating high strength steel with cadmium, which reduces the likelihood of failure by 5%
(F)ailure Mode (D)esign (P)arameter (D)esign Change (L)ikellihood Change  
Figure 7.  Sample Risk Mitigation Strategy Format 
 
Another potential use for this evaluation would be the creation of a knowledge 
base and taxonomy of mitigation strategies.  With the current means of reporting and 
recording mitigation strategies, there is no set form to present or record data.  Using the 
attributes presented here, mitigation strategies could be collected and evaluated using the 
method presented in this paper, and then sorted and categorized into a taxonomy.  This 
taxonomy would contain the appropriate information that a product designer could use to 
implement these strategies in their design, based on the failure modes they have 
determined the product may suffer from.  The Design and Environment Changes give 
different potential approaches to handling a given risk.  Further, the inclusion of the 
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Likelihood and Consequence Changes would demonstrate what effects the strategy would 
have on the risk of those failure modes, and the Design Parameters would directly 
identify which aspects of the design need to be altered or maintained. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper focuses on how risk mitigation strategies are communicated.  Six risk 
mitigation attributes were developed and an analysis of sample risk elements was 
performed.  This analysis was based on the sub-field of linguistics called pragmatics, as 
pragmatics focuses on the context of the communication.  The theories of Gricean 
Cooperation Principle, Functional Analysis, and Relevance theories were used to evaluate 
the attributes of the mitigation strategies, and they were found to be generally deficient.  
One solution to this deficiency was to improve the communication of the context of risk 
mitigation strategies was the use of the six mitigation attributes. 
Using the mitigation attributes presented here can provide a means to store risk 
mitigation strategies to be used at a later date.  Further, the design and environmental 
changes could be used along with the failure mode and design parameters to link the 
corresponding design parameters for a given failure mode, to help select appropriate risk 
mitigation strategies for a given failure mode.  A knowledge base of collected mitigation 
strategies along with a means to link them to the important portions of a failure mode 
would allow a tool to help rapidly generate risk mitigation strategies for a new product. 
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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to introduce the risk mitigation strategy taxonomy and 
demonstrate how it can link failure modes of a product to mitigation strategies, and 
then use those strategies along with failure mode models to refine the strategy for a 
given product.  While models for failure modes are readily available in scientific 
textbooks and journals, a specific guideline for implementing product changes 
related to these models to reduce failures (i.e. mitigations) does not yet exist.  
Currently, most risk mitigation techniques rely on the expertise of the engineers on 
their team. The risk mitigation strategy taxonomy seeks to improve this situation by 
providing a set of mitigation strategies that can be easily linked to failure modes a 
product may experience.  This taxonomy is created from an empirical collection of 
mitigation strategies used in industry for failure mitigation, storing the data in a 
consistent format that allows it to be used for future risk mitigation.  By using this 
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taxonomy, an engineer can supplement their experience with historical mitigation 
data and more effectively mitigate risk. 
 
Keywords: risk mitigation, failure analysis, conceptual design, risk linguistics 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to introduce a risk mitigation taxonomy that can be 
used during design to reduce risk of product failure.  Throughout all fields of engineering, 
failure, especially unplanned, tends to be problematic for the product and its user. 
Unplanned product failures can be catastrophic, such as Toyota’s many recent recalls.  A 
simple design flaw which caused seizure and uncontrolled acceleration in the car caused 
52 deaths and 32 injuries, lead to the recall of 4.5 million vehicles, and cost the company 
$900 million in repairs and $155 million in lost business after the recalls (CBS, 2010). 
Planning for failures like this from the beginning can save lives and cost such as this, and 
performing such an analysis during the initial stages of design costs the least and has the 
largest effect on the end product (Ullman, 2003). 
Risk mitigation is the process of limiting risks, planning for potential 
emergencies, and measuring and controlling any remaining risk in the system (Wang and 
Roush, 2000).  Risk mitigation methods involve the generation of plans that remove the 
risk from a product, reducing the risk by making it less likely to occur or reducing the 
consequence of its occurrence, or transferring the risk to a different, less vital system.  
For instances when the risk can’t be completely removed, it also entails the design of 
plans for when the risk does occur, and measuring and controlling that remaining risk 
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(Wang and Roush, 2000).  These plans, “risk mitigation strategies,” tend to be created 
using the experience and expertise of the team that develop them, though some tools do 
exist to help with the task. 
By performing risk and failure mitigation early, even great disasters can be 
reduced.  In the recent earthquake and tsunami in Japan, the potential nuclear disaster at 
the Fukushima reactors was reduced by risk mitigation strategies in place before the 
earthquake took place.  From the construction of the reactor itself keeping the radioactive 
material inside, to the use of boric acid to control reactions and keep heat down, every 
plan was in place before the accident.  What could have easily spiralled out of control 
was kept in check by the defense-in-depth strategy used in the design of the reactors 
(World Nuclear, 2011). 
As in the Fukushima case, it is desirable for mitigation plans to be in place and 
tested before accidents occur.  In the case of the Deepwater Horizon oilrig operated by 
British Petroleum, many strategies that were either partially or totally ineffectual at 
capping the spilling oil were designed and used after the accident had occurred.  From 
April 24 to September 21, 15 different mitigation strategies were attempted, with limited 
degrees of success, before finally closing the well (Guardian, 2010). 
In light of disasters and failures such as these, this risk mitigation strategy 
taxonomy seeks to collect successful mitigation strategies and organize them into a 
common language.  This common language, called the risk mitigation taxonomy, will 
enable efficient potential mitigation strategy identification for a product. 
This taxonomy will classify historical failure mitigation strategies, and allow for 
the creation of a knowledge base of successful mitigation strategies that can be expanded 
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or tailored for different disciplines.  This knowledge base will enable efficient mitigation 
of product failures during the earliest stages of the design process, when the changes can 
most easily be introduced at the least cost. 
 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Risk Mitigation 
There are only a few tools available to create risk mitigation strategies.  Most, 
such as system reliability (Coit, 2000) evaluate strategies or analysis methods.  These 
tools vary in their design and application, ranging from anti-terrorism (anti-terrorism risk-
based decision aid, ARDA) (Dillon, et al., 2009) to weighing decisions across multiple 
stakeholders (risk-based distributed allocation methodology, R-DRAM) (Qiu, Ge, and 
Yim, 2007), both of which use a highly developed system and cost-benefit analysis to 
weigh the risks of a system, and determine the best strategies to employ.  Others, such as 
adaptive management, measure and change strategies using the real world as an 
experiment, adapting to risks in real time rather than preparing a plan once (Brody, et al., 
2009).  Even some risk analysis tools, such as failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), 
include risk mitigation in their execution, requiring an action plan for each identified risk 
(Department of Defense, 1949).  For all of these tools, though, the individual strategies 
must be developed on their own, using expert knowledge, or require a well developed 
system which doesn’t exist early during product design. 
To promote risk mitigation it is necessary to identify a common language of 
mitigation strategies.  This mitigation taxonomy would permit cataloging of engineering 
expertise and enable efficient risk mitigation. 
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2.2 Emerging Taxonomies 
There are several languages that have recently been developed to aid with the 
design process and risk analysis.  These languages, the functional basis, the component 
taxonomy, and the failure mode taxonomy, were used as guidelines for the population of 
the mitigation strategy taxonomy. 
The functional basis, previously the function taxonomy, was brought about in an 
attempt to classify and standardize the terms used to conceptualize, define, or understand 
a product in terms of its function and purpose (Stone and Wood, 1999).  Functional 
modeling, a process used to create models of a product’s functions, suffered from a lack 
of precise definitions, making it difficult to reconcile functional models created by 
different designers.  There have been several attempts to rectify this situation, dating back 
as far as the 1940s (Akiyama, 1991, Miles, 1972, VAI, 1993).  Further, a common 
vocabulary is important in categorizing and archiving design knowledge.  Collins et al. 
created a list of 105 functions to describe the mechanical functions of helicopters, and 
store failure data (1976).  These early attempts lead the way for more organized and 
structured attempts.  Pahl and Beitz, Hundal, Koch et al., and Kirschman and Fadel 
proposed breaking the functions and flows into groups or classes, using a variety of 
methods and strategies such as living systems theory, or a departure from the verb-object 
format (1988, 1990, 1994).  By building off Pahl and Beitz’s model to include functions 
and flows, a means to compare different products was developed.  This functional basis 
was created through empirical study of over 100 products, and refined the categories set 
up by Pahl and Beitz to a higher degree, creating two more levels of detail (Kirschman 
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and Fadel, 1998, Little, Wood, and McAdams, 1997).  Since its creation, the functional 
basis has undergone evolution and application, adding definitions for the flows (Stone, 
1997), as well as applying to the creation of functional models, product similarity 
computations (McAdams, Stone, and Wood, 1999), design by analogy (McAdams and 
Wood, 2000), and functional tolerancing (McAdams and Wood, 1999).  It is constructed 
primarily based on empirical studies, gained from studying a large number of existing 
products (Hirtz, et al., 2002).  Even now, the basis is refined, such as the comparison to 
the NIST research efforts, used to find similarities and areas that the basis did not yet 
cover (Hirtz, et al. 2002). 
The component taxonomy is a naming convention for mechanical parts (Kurtoglu, 
et al., 2005).  This convention was developed as a way to abstract the complex 
components of a product down to a high level name to simplify information transfer and 
improve concept generation during the design process.  The component taxonomy is 
based on the concept of a lexicon, which assumes that every artifact created has some 
function or purpose that it was created to fulfill (Chenhall, 1978).  By using this thought, 
classifications for naming objects can be divided into three hierarchies:  major categories, 
a controlled list of classification terms, and an open ended list of names.  By using the 
controlled list of terms, a unique name can be generated for any object, similar to the 
Linnaean system of classifying species (Linnaei, 1937).  The space breaks the mechanical 
objects into four categories: Functional form, components whose name is based on the 
function they perform, based on the functional basis; geometric shapes, components 
whose names are based on the geometry of the component; simple mechanics, 
components that are related to one of the seven simple machines (Greer, et al., 2003); and 
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nature, components whose names are based on their similarity to natural objects.  Using 
these categories, 114 terms were collected from literature and technical publications, such 
as technical reference books, design texts, museum nomenclature, dictionaries, as well as 
the expertise of the creators (Greer, et al., 2003).  By using the basis alongside functional 
modeling and tools such as the function component matrix (Strawbridge, McAdams, and 
Stone, 2002), a concept generator (Bryant, Stone, and McAdams, 2006) can be formed, 
allowing many potential designs to be easily generated from a single functional model. 
The failure mode taxonomy attempts to do for the field of failure analysis what 
the functional and component basis did for the field of design.  The failure mode 
taxonomy is a standardized collection of failure modes for electromechanical systems 
(Tumer, Stone, and Bell, 2003).  It was created to add a consistent language to risk 
analysis and stemmed from the work of Collins, using his list of mechanical failures as 
the beginning (1976).  From here, additional mechanical failure modes were added 
through empirical failure data from National Transportation Safety Bureau rotorcraft 
accident reports, as well as accident report from NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab (Tumer, 
Stone, and Roberts, 2003, Roberts, Stone, and Tumer, 2002).  These were supplemented 
with electrical failure modes necessary to the highly automated systems used in NASA’s 
projects.  This electro-mechanical failure mode taxonomy can be used in conjunction 
with the functional and component basis to provide a means of detecting failure during 
the early portion of the design process.  The Function Failure Design Method (FFDM) 
provided a way to link between the functions a product must perform and the failure 
modes they are likely to be susceptible to, by using the components that answer those 
functions and have failed by given failure modes as the common link (Stock, Stone, and 
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Tumer, 2003).  Building on that, the Risk in Early Design method provided a means to 
rank the failure a product may experience into high, moderate, and low risks, based on 
the consequence and likelihood of the failure happening (Grantham Lough, 2005).  In 
recent years, additional failure mode taxonomies have been developed for varied fields. 
 Failure mode taxonomies have been developed for the business environment, dealing 
with the potential losses due to events and organization of the business itself (Patil, 
2008).  The chemical failure mode taxonomy deals with the risks of serious injury or 
damage caused by chemicals reacting in uncontrolled or unplanned ways (Ombete, 
2009).  Each of these taxonomies is still a work in progress, as there are failure modes 
that have not yet been discovered.  As time progresses, these taxonomies will be 
populated with additional “new” failure modes, allowing these new modes to influence 
design of new products. 
 
2.3 Linguistic Analysis of Risk Mitigation Strategies 
Before being able to create a taxonomy for risk mitigation strategies, a linguistic 
analysis of available risk mitigation strategies must be performed.  Based on a similar 
analysis of risk elements performed by Grantham Lough et al (2009), Krus and Grantham 
(2011) discuss one way of categorizing risk mitigation strategies based on the subfield of 
linguistics called pragmatics, as that field focuses on how statements are used to 
communicate and how they relate to the context of a discussion (Barsalou, 1992, Wilson 
and Kiel, 1999).  The context of mitigation strategies were evaluated using three theories 
of pragmatics, the Gricean Cooperation Principle, the Functional Approach, and 
Relevance Theory. These mitigation strategies were broken into six potential attributes 
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and rated on the different maxims of each theory.  These six attributes were the Failure 
Mode that the mitigation strategy was designed to fix, the Design or Environment 
Changes that were used to enact the fix, the Likelihood and Consequence Changes that 
are the effect of the strategy, and the Design Parameters that the engineer can directly 
affect.  By determining which and how many of these six attributes a strategy contains, 
the number of maxims the strategy adequately meets can be determined (Krus and 
Grantham, 2011).  This allowed for the quantification of valuable information contained 
in each risk mitigation strategy.  This is the foundation that will be used to construct the 
mitigation strategy taxonomy and ensure that the language effectively communicates 
mitigation strategies. 
 
2.4 Literature Summary 
To meet the need for risk mitigation in engineering, a knowledge base of potential 
risk mitigation strategies will be collected to allow access to the collected knowledge of 
others and what has reduced risks for them.  The knowledge base will be used to 
determine the risk mitigation taxonomy.  This sort of taxonomy will follow in the 
footsteps of similar efforts, such as the functional basis (Stone and Wood, 1999), failure 
mode taxonomy (Kurtoglu, 2005), and the component taxonomy (Tumer, Stone, and Bell, 
2003).  These create a common language, which allows different designers to understand 
each other, reduce confusion, and better understand past applications of these terms, as 
well as perform mathematic operations on them.  In the creation of this taxonomy, using 
the linguistic analysis suggested by Krus and Grantham (Krus and Grantham, 2011), it is 
hoped these helpful features can be brought to the field of risk mitigation. 
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3 THE MITIGATION STRATEGY TAXONOMY CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 
This section details the terms in the mitigation strategy taxonomy and the 
strategies defined.  Section 3.1 details how strategies were collected, classified into 
categories, and named.  Section 3.2 presents the resultant taxonomy. 
 
3.1 Mitigation Data Collection 
The risk mitigation strategy taxonomy was created from an empirical collection of 
strategies from corporate data, engineering textbooks, and case studies.  These sources 
contained failure case studies with detailed accounts of how a specific component or 
product failed, and recommendations on how to prevent such failures from occurring in 
the future.  A total of 325 risk mitigation case studies were studied during the creation of 
the taxonomy. The ASM International’s Handbook of Case Histories in Failure Analysis 
Volume 2 accounts for 168 of the strategies (Esakul, 1993), while Learning from Design 
Failures provided another 95 (Hatamura, 2009). A case study from NASA’s redesign of 
the space shuttle’s fuel tank was able to provide data for 22 mitigation strategies (Miller, 
2011). Last but not least, corporate data from two companies was drawn upon to generate 
40 of the strategies.  Please note that it is the goal of the authors to continue investigating 
risk mitigation case studies to analyze and continuously improve both the taxonomy and 
knowledge base. 
 
3.2 Mitigation Data Analysis 
Mitigation techniques were collected and processed based on the six risk 
mitigation attributes identified by Krus and Grantham (2011), dividing the strategies into 
    
75 
a description, a failure mode, design parameters, environment and design changes, and 
likelihood and consequence changes.  If information, such as the risk likelihood or risk 
consequence change due to employing the risk mitigation strategy was missing from a 
report under study, the analysts used their engineering experience to evaluate whether the 
strategy would have an affect on the consequence or likelihood of the risk. 
 
3.2.1 Classifying Risk Mitigation Strategies.  The risk mitigation strategies 
from the case studies analyzed were broken down into three basic categories, based on 
Wang and Roush’s definition of how strategies affect risk: by making a change to reduce 
or remove the risk, by measuring or controlling the remaining risk, or by planning for a 
potential failure (2000).  These categories can be further divided by whether the strategy 
affects a design or environment parameter.  Of the 325 case studies, 152 made changes to 
reduce or remove risk; 108 were determined to be design changes, and 44 were 
environment changes.  The remaining 173 strategies were either one of the other two 
categories, measuring and controlling a risk or planning for when the risk occurred, had 
no identifiable failure mode, or were a part of the design process, such as building a 
prototype.  This categorization scheme was selected first due to similar environment and 
design parameters existing in failure mode models (Krus and Grantham 2010). 
For this initial version of the taxonomy, only the strategies that make a change to 
reduce or remove a risk were focused on, leaving the other two categories for future work 
and additional strategies.  These strategies were divided into Design changes and 
Environment changes, based on the parameter they affected.  These parameters are taken 
from failure mode models, such as the stress life method and strain life method for 
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modeling fatigue.  These models can be broken down into design parameters and 
environment parameters, based on whether or not the engineer has direct control over the 
parameter.  Design changes are populated with strategies that change aspects of the 
design that the engineer has direct control over, such as “Shape Part” or “Convert 
Material,” as the geometry of a part and the material it is made out of can be directly 
changed by the engineer (Krus and Grantham, 2010), resulting in a product or system that 
is different from the original design.  Environment changes, on the other hand, are 
populated with strategies that don’t change the product, instead focusing on changing the 
environment parameters of a failure mode.  These strategies attempt to indirectly change 
the risk to a product by affecting the environment parameters, or the aspects of a design 
the engineer has no direct control over (Krus and Grantham, 2010), such as “Extract 
Contaminant” and “Stabilize Temperature,” which involve trying to control what 
contaminants the product is exposed to and trying to maintain a constant temperature, 
both of which cannot be directly changed. These were considered beyond the scope of 
this initial taxonomy, and would be left for future work. With additional time and 
information, these two other categories can be added to the taxonomy. 
A designer can use these categories to select mitigation strategies that are most 
applicable to their needs and situation.  By separating the strategies into these categories, 
the taxonomy can help focus the engineer during risk mitigation. 
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3.2.2 Naming the Strategies.  While collecting and cataloguing strategies, the 
descriptions collected varied greatly based on available resources.  For instance, the 
length, radius, or even shape of a shaft could be altered all to fix the same failure mode of 
high cycle fatigue.  To promote effective mitigation communication, it’s important to 
create descriptive, encompassing names for similar strategies, much the same way as the 
component taxonomy groups together similar artifacts.  Through a series of 
categorizations, the initial 325 case studies were grouped into the categories mentioned in 
the previous sections, and the 152 that were determined to be changes for reducing or 
removing the risk were further evaluated.   
The first step in this effort was to group the strategies together based on similar 
types of changes.  As discussed above, they were separated into design and environment 
categories.  The initial grouping created 69 design categories and 59 environment 
categories, before excising mitigation strategies belonging to the other two groupings.  
For instance, all strategies that added a lubricant were grouped together and called “add 
lubricant.”  Similarly, groups like “change part geometry,” where some geometric aspect 
of a part was altered, or “ensure part was cleaned properly,” where the contaminants 
needed to be cleaned from a part before use.  However, many of the separate groups 
contained only a single strategy, and could be seen as similar.  In order to best use the 
strategies, consistent definitions needed to be established for the different strategies.   
As part of this constant definition, the functional basis (Tumer, Stone, and Bell, 
2003) was used.  The functions from the functional basis provide clearly and consistently 
defined verbs that could be used to describe the actions the mitigation strategies 
performed.  Each mitigation strategy was evaluated based on the function it performed to 
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mitigate the risk.  These determined functions became the verbs used in the mitigation 
strategy taxonomy.  For the objects, each strategy was evaluated to determine the object 
the above function operated on.  These empirically determined objects were used as the 
objects for the mitigation strategy taxonomy.  Using these two parts, each strategy can 
then be identified by a verb-object pair taken from these two sets.  Using the above 
examples, “add lubricant” became “import lubricant,” as it was bringing lubricant in from 
outside the system; “change part geometry” became “shape part” as the form of the object 
was changed; and “ensure part was cleaned properly” became “extract contaminant” as 
the outside contaminants were stripped away from the part. 
This lead to the risk mitigation strategies being grouped into 42 categories by 
identifying common themes between strategies, such as the action they perform to 
mitigate the risk, such as “stabilizing” or “regulating” some aspect of the product, or what 
about the design they affect, such as a “part” or the “temperature.”   
The ultimate goal of this naming scheme is to produce a taxonomy that mirrors 
the form and functionality of the functional basis, where a consistent set of objects and 
verbs allows new functions to be created by combining functions and flows.  In this same 
way, having a consistent set of definitions for the objects and verbs in the taxonomy 
would allow newfound strategies to be added to the taxonomy using a combination of 
existing verbs and objects.  This will allow for data collected on mitigation strategies to 
be quantified and stored for future use, and used to evaluate different mitigation 
strategies. 
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3.3 The Risk Mitigation Strategy Taxonomy 
Presented here are the terms identified in the risk mitigation strategy taxonomy.  
The verbs contained in these strategies were obtained from the functional basis (Tumer, 
Stone and Bell, 2003), and their definitions follow the forms outlined by the functional 
basis.  The objects are a collection of terms that have been empirically determined after 
evaluating the collected mitigation strategies.  These were then combined to form the 42 
distinct mitigation strategies shown below. 
 
3.3.1 Mitigation Strategy Taxonomy Definitions. 
1. Change Natural Frequency – To adjust or alter the harmonic frequency of an 
object in a predetermined and fixed manner.   
2. Condition Material – To render the substance that makes up the product or 
part appropriate for the desired use.  
3. Condition Part – To render a component or portion of the overall product 
appropriate for the desired use.  
4. Convert Fuel – To change from one chemical required for a combustion 
reaction to another. 
5. Convert Material – To change from one substance that makes up the product 
or part to another. 
6. Convert Part – To change from one component or portion of the overall 
product to another. 
7. Convert Process – To change from one step or operation in the manufacture 
of a product to another. 
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8. Couple Part – To join or bring together components or portions of the overall 
product such that the members are still distinguishable from each other. 
9. Decrease Load – To reduce the forces to which a product is subjected in 
response to a control signal. 
10. Decrease Motion – To reduce a products ability to move freely in response to 
a control signal. 
11. Decrease Power Assistance – To reduce additional force added to the system 
to assist with a given load in response to a control signal. 
12. Decrease Torque – To reduce a turning or twisting force in response to a 
control signal. 
13. Decrement Noise – To reduce an unwanted signal or disturbance in and 
electronic device or instrument in a predetermined and fixed manner. 
14. Decrement Voltage – To reduce the electric potential in a predetermined and 
fixed manner. 
15. Extract Contaminant – To draw, or forcibly pull out, foreign material whose 
presence can cause damage or deterioration of the product. 
16. Import Lubricant – To bring in an agent added to a product to reduce the 
friction between two bodies from outside the system boundary. 
17. Import Material – To bring in a substance that makes up the product or part 
from outside the system boundary. 
18. Import Part – To bring in a component or portion of the overall product from 
outside the system boundary. 
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19. Import Stress – To bring in a force distributed through an area of a product 
from outside the system boundary. 
20. Increase Controls – To enlarge a set of orders or rules that are followed to 
keep the product within proper specifications in response to a control signal. 
21. Increase Flow – To enlarge the rate at which a fluid moves through a given 
area in response to a control signal. 
22. Increase Load – To enlarge the forces to which a product is subjected in 
response to a control signal. 
23. Increase Temperature – To enlarge the degree of hotness or coldness 
measured on a definite scale in response to a control signal. 
24. Increase Torque – To enlarge a turning or twisting force in response to a 
control signal. 
25. Inhibit Contaminant – To significantly restrain a foreign material whose 
presence can cause damage or deterioration of the product, though a portion of it 
continues to be transferred. 
26. Inhibit Moisture – To significantly restrain water particles either suspended in 
the air or on the product, though a portion of it continues to be transferred. 
27. Inhibit Noise – To significantly restrain an unwanted signal or disturbance in 
and electronic device or instrument, though a portion of it continues to be 
transferred. 
28. Inhibit Temperature – To significantly restrain the degree of hotness or 
coldness measured on a definite scale, though a portion of it continues to be 
transferred. 
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29. Position Part – To place a component or portion of the overall product into a 
specific location or orientation. 
30. Process Material – To submit the substance that makes up the product or part 
to a particular treatment or method having a set number of operations or steps.   
31. Regulate Flow – To adjust the rate at which a fluid moves through a given 
area in response to a control signal, such as a characteristic of the flow. 
32. Remove Part – To take away a component or portion of the overall product 
from its prefixed place. 
33. Secure Part – To firmly fix a component’s or portion of the overall product’s 
path. 
34. Separate Contaminant – To isolate a foreign material whose presence can 
cause damage or deterioration of the product into distinct components. 
35. Separate Part – To isolate a component or portion of the overall product into 
distinct components. 
36. Shape Part – To mold or form a component or portion of the overall product. 
37. Stabilize Flow – To prevent the rate at which a fluid moves through a given 
area from changing course or location. 
38. Stabilize Process – To prevent a step or operation in the manufacture of a 
product from changing course or location. 
39. Stabilize Temperature – To prevent the degree of hotness or coldness 
measured on a definite scale from changing course or location. 
40. Stabilize Voltage – To prevent the electric potential from changing course or 
location. 
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41. Stop Process – To cease, or prevent, the transfer of a step or operation in the 
manufacture of a product. 
42. Store Part – To accumulate components or portions of the overall product. 
 
This collection of 42 names and definitions can be used to describe mitigation 
strategies, allowing them to be catalogued and communicated in a consistent manner.  
Using the information contained in the taxonomy, risks in a new product can be mitigated 
efficiently, by quickly identifying risk mitigation strategies that can be applied. 
 
4 HOW TO USE THE TAXONOMY TO IMPROVE RISK MITIGATION 
The mitigation strategy taxonomy presented in the previous section can be used at 
any point during the products lifespan, from conceptual design to the retiring of the 
product.  However, it is most useful to use the taxonomy to help eliminate failures during 
the conceptual design of the product, when changes can be made more simply and with 
less cost.  In order to accomplish this, these mitigation strategies need to link to the 
failure modes that they aim to mitigate. 
The mitigation strategies that exist in the taxonomy are linked to potential risks by 
failure modes.  If a strategy was used to resolve a particular failure mode in the past, it 
makes sense that it could be applicable to the same failure mode in the future.  Shown 
below, in Figure 1, is a step-by-step breakdown of the process, as outlined in this section. 









Transfer Mechanical Energy fails due to High 
Cycle Fatigue 
(4, 4) 
Import Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Guide Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Export Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Transfer Mechanical energy fails due to Impact 
Fracture 
(5, 1) 
Regulate Mechanical energy fails due to High 
Cycle Fatigue 
(5, 1) 
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Figure 1.  Breakdown of the Risk Mitigation Process Using the Mitigation Strategy 
Taxonomy 
 
Step 1:  Identify Potential Risks 
The first step in the risk mitigation process is to identify the potential risks in the 
system.  This task can be accomplished using any available risk analysis method or tool, 
such as FMEA, fault or event trees, or RED analysis.  The failure modes corresponding to 
the risks will be used to identify potential mitigation strategies from the taxonomy. 
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Step 2:  Select Potential Mitigation Strategies 
The risk mitigation strategy taxonomy possesses data in the form of the design 
and environment parameters that mitigations strategies changed to prevent their failures.  
In this step, those parameters are matched up to the parameters found in the models of the 
failure modes from the risk analysis performed in Step 1.  Failure mode models can be 
broken down into the design and environment parameters (Krus and Grantham, 2010), 
and they can be used to link failure modes with mitigation strategies.  A search or sort of 
the mitigation strategy taxonomy would identify strategies that affected certain design 
parameters, creating a list of potential mitigation strategies that can be used on the 
product. 
 
Step 3:  Assess the Potential Mitigation Strategies 
The mitigation strategies need to be analyzed to determine the applicable 
mitigation strategies for each specific case.  Not every mitigation strategy is applicable in 
all situations.  The list of strategies that have been generated needs to be evaluated, and 
the best potential strategy from the list selected based on the applicability of the strategy, 
available resources, and potential impacts, based on the information contained within the 
taxonomy and the engineer’s experience. 
The mitigation strategy taxonomy is a design tool that can be used to help 
mitigate the risk of failure any time in the product’s life.  It can be used alongside 
traditional risk mitigation methods to increase the design of safer and more failure free 
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products not just during conceptual design, but any time during the expected life of the 
product. 
 
5 WIND TURBINE CASE STUDY 
Presented here is an example of the above steps, applied to the design of a wind 
turbine during the conceptual stage of design.  After the analysis has been performed, it 
will be compared to case studies not included in the taxonomy. 
A wind turbine is an unmanned generator, powered by wind currents that are 
converted into mechanical energy by large fan blades.  This in turn turns the turbine 
through the gearbox, and generates electrical energy that is stored in batteries before 
being sent to where it is needed.  These large generators are important to analyze for risk, 
as it may be difficult to perform maintenance on them in the field (they are often used far 
from most towns and cities) and are under constant use. 
The first step of this process is to determine the potential risks for the product.  
Since this analysis occurs during the conceptual design of the product, a functional model 
was created to employ the Risk in Early Design (RED) method for obtaining the 
product’s risks.  Shown in Figure 2 is the functional model of the wind turbine.  The 
product takes in Gas (the wind), Kinetic Energy (the motion of the wind), and a status 
signal (what direction the wind is blowing), and output the Gas and Electrical energy. 




Figure 2. Wind Turbine Functional Model 
 
This functional model is used as an input to the RED risk analysis.  Using these 
fifteen functions, a RED analysis is performed.  This analysis produced 1 high-risk 
element, 7 moderate risk elements, and 48 low risk elements, shown in Figure 3.  Figure 
3 also shows the 8 highest risk elements, including the function, failure mode, likelihood, 
and consequence of failure.  
 
Transfer Mechanical Energy fails due to High 
Cycle Fatigue 
(4, 4) 
Import Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Guide Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Export Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Transfer Mechanical energy fails due to Impact 
Fracture 
(5, 1) 
Regulate Mechanical energy fails due to High 
Cycle Fatigue 
(5, 1) 




Transfer Mechanical energy fails due to Yielding (4, 2) 
  
Figure 3.  Wind Turbine RED Analysis Fever Chart 
 
The second step is to determine the potential mitigation strategies for these risks.  
The risks shown in Figure 3 are caused by the failure modes “high cycle fatigue,” 
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“impact fracture,” “thermal shock,” and “yielding.”  The parameters for these failure 
modes, as shown in (Krus and Grantham, 2010), are shown below in Table 1.  Data for 
thermal shock is not shown as there is currently no information on the design and 
environment parameters for that failure mode. 
 
Table 1.  Design and Environment Parameters for High Cycle Fatigue, Impact Fracture, 












Using these design and environment parameters, the taxonomy is searched for 
mitigation strategies that have changed those parameters.  Shown below in Table 2, are 
the results of those searches for “impact fracture.” Tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C 
contain the results for “high cycle fatigue” and “yielding.”  In these tables, the strategies 
are shown with their definition, failure modes they have historically solved, whether the 
strategy lead to a change in the consequence of risk, likelihood of risk, or both, and the 
design and environment parameters involved in the case.   As can be seen from these 
three tables, there are 5 strategies for “impact fracture,” 7 for “yielding,” and 10 for “high 
cycle fatigue.”   
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The final step is assessing these potential mitigation strategies.  For “impact 
fracture,” the five strategies present ways of altering environment parameters to control 
the risk.  Conditioning the part involves treating the part to reduce the stress, and 
converting the material changes the material to reduce the stress as well.  Converting the 
part switches the part to change the velocity of an impact.  Finally, positioning and 
shaping the part alter the position of the part or its shape, to change the stress.  Of these 
choices, converting the part is the most obvious strategy, as this would lower the velocity 
of the impact by switching out the part for a different one so it is struck with less 
velocity, or is out of the path of being struck (reducing the impact velocity to zero).  The 
other strategies all indirectly try to decrease the stress due to the impact, making the 
impact less damaging. 
For “high cycle fatigue” and “yielding” can be evaluated in similar fashions.  For 
“high cycle fatigue,” securing the part and converting the material would be the ideal 
choices, as converting the material would change two potential parameters with a single 
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strategy, allowing for greater control of the failure, and securing the part would also 
reduce the consequence of failure as well as the likelihood. “ Yielding” would be best 
handled by conditioning the material, the part, or increasing controls.  Conditioning the 
material and part could be accomplished at the same time, and provide similar benefits to 
each other.  Increasing the controls during manufacturing could increase the tensile 
strength of the part, giving it greater resistance to the failure mode.  Further, condition the 
material and increasing the control would reduce the consequence as well, adding an 
additional benefit to selecting them. 
These strategies were compared to a report by Manwell et al. (1999), which 
examined potential failures in a wind-turbine’s gearbox, which can be represented as 
transfer mechanical energy in the above functional model.  This report mentioned that 
impact fracture was one of the failures found in the gearbox.  Three recommendations 
were made in the report, offering strategies of using improved 1st stage carriers with 
spherical bearings, improving the retention by using a tighter fit or locking mechanism, 
and adding a teeter damper to the design.  These correspond to mitigation strategies of 
converting a part, positioning a part, or importing a part.  As shown above, for impact 
fracture, the mitigation strategy taxonomy was able to determine two of the mitigation 
strategies suggested by the report.  In a similar report on mitigations that have been 
performed on wind turbines (Moser, 2010), lubrication, tapered roller bearings, and 
refined material processing have removed similar failures.  The refined material 
processing (condition material) is reported by both yielding and high cycle fatigue, and 
the bearings, as discussed above, are an application of convert part, which also covers 
yielding.  As shown by these two examples, the mitigation strategy taxonomy can 
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correctly generate mitigation strategies that have been generated based on expertise, not 
using the taxonomy. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
By using the mitigation strategy taxonomy presented here, engineers can add to 
their own experience and perform a more thorough mitigation of their products.  The 
taxonomy assists with the mitigation of failure right from the beginning of the design 
process, allowing failure mitigation to become integral to the design of the product.  
Further, as the product becomes more developed, additional strategies can be selected for 
more specific aspects of the design, maintaining the focus on designing a failure free 
product.  Finally, it categorizes mitigation strategies into a common language that can aid 
in the communication of risk and mitigation. 
The taxonomy is also a growing project.  Additional failure mitigation strategies 
will be added to the taxonomy, making it more complete and increasing the diversity of 
potential strategies.  Like the failure mode taxonomy and component taxonomy, the risk 
mitigation strategies will grow as new mitigation strategies and failure modes that need 
mitigation strategies appear. 
A means of rating potential strategies also needs to be created.  Using the 
collected information in the taxonomy, rating using the likelihood change, consequence 
change, and a popularity rating based on the number of times a strategy has been 
encountered, a series of calculations could be made to help automate and speed the risk 
mitigation procedure.  Further, the selection method presented in this paper could be 
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automated, allowing the transition from function-failure mode pairs to mitigation 
strategies to smoothly flow, and be implemented in the same program. 
 
    
93 
REFERENCES 
“Analyst: Recall Costs Toyota $155M a Week As Fix for Gas Pedal Problem Underway, 
Japanese Auto Giant Braces for Public Backlash,” 2010.   Retrieved September 
22, 2010, from 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/02/02/business/main6165930.shtml 
 
Akiyama, K., 1991.  Function Analysis:  Systematic Improvement of Quality 
Performance. Productivity Press. 
 
Barsalou LW, 1992. Cognitive Psychology:  An overview for Cognitive Scientists. 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 




Brody, S. D., S. Zahran, et al., 2009. "Policy Learning for Flood Mitigation:  AA 
Longitudinal Assessment of the Community Rating System in Florida." Risk 
Analysis 29(6): 912-929. 
 
Bryant, C., Stone, R., McAdams, D., 2006, “Automated concept generation from the 
functional basis of design,” Accepted to Research in Engineering Design. 
 
Chenhall, R. G., 1978, Nomenclature for Museum Cataloging: A System for Classifying 
Man-Made Objects, American Association for State and Local History, Nashville, 
TN. 
 
Coit, D. W., 2000. “System Reliability Prediction Prioritization Strategy.” Paper 
presented at the Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium. 
 
Collins, J., Hagan, B., and Bratt, H., 1976, “The Failure-Experience Matrix - a Useful 
Design Tool,” Transactions of the ASME, Series B, Journal of Engineering in 
Industry, 98:1074-1079. 
 
Depatmnet of Defense, 1949. Proceedures for performing failure mode, effects, and 
criticality analysis. 
 
Dillon, R. L., R. M. Liebe, et al., 2009. "Risk-Based Decision Making for Terrorism 
Applications." Risk Analysis 29(3): 321-335. 
 
“Fukushima Accident 2011,” 2011.  Retrieved November 3, 2011 from www.world-
nuclear.org/info/fukushima_accident_inf129.html. 
 
Grantham Lough K, et al., 2009. "Promoting risk communication in early design through 
linguistic analyses " Research in Engineering Design, vol. 20, pp. 29-40. 
    
94 
Grantham Lough, K., 2005. “Risk in Early Design.” Unpublished Dissertation, University 
of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, MO. 
 
Greer, J., Stock, M., Stone, R. and Wood, K., 2003, “Enumerating the Component Space: 
First Steps Toward a Design Naming Convention for Mechanical Parts,” 
Accepted to Proceedings of DETC2003, Chicago, IL. 
 
Handbook of Case Histories in Failure, 1993. 2. Ed. Khlefa A. Esaklul. Ohio: Materials 
Park. 
 
Hatamura, Y., 2009. Learning from Design. Springer. 
 
Hirtz, J., Stone, R., McAdams, D., Szykman, S. and Wood, K., 2002, “A Functional 
Basis for Engineering Design: Reconciling and Evolving Previous Efforts,” 
Research in Engineering Design 13(2):65-82. 
 
Hundal, M., 1990, “A Systematic Method for Developing Function Structures, Solutions 
and Concept Variants,” Mechanism and Machine Theory, 25(3):243-256. 
 
J. F. Manwell, A. Rogers, U. Abdulwahid, A. Ellis and B. P. McNiff, 1999. "Wind 
Turbine Gearbox Evaluation," Proc. European Wind energy Conference, Nice, 
France. 
 
Kirschman, C., Fadel, G., 1998. “Classifying Functions for Mechanical Design,” Journal 
of Mechanical Design, Transactions of the ASME, 120(3):475-482. 
 
Koch, P., Peplinski, J., Allen, J. and Mistree, F., 1994, “A Method for Design Using 
Available Assets: Identifying a Feasible System Configuration,” Behavioral 
Science, 30:229-250. 
 
Krus, D., and Grantham K., 2010. "A Step Toward Risk Mitigation During Conceptual 
Product Design: Component Selection for Risk Reduction," in IDETC 2010, 
Montreal, Qubec. 
 
Krus, D., Grantham, K., 2011. “Towards failure free design:  an analysis of risk 
mitigation communication.”  In IDETC 2011, Washington DC, 2011. 
 
Kurtoglu, T., Campbell, M.I., Bryant, C.R., Stone, R.B., McAdams, D.A., 2005, 
“Deriving a Component Basis for Computational Functional Synthesis,” 
Proceedings of International Conference on Engineering Design, ICED05, August 
15-18, Melbourne, Australia. 
 
Linnaei, C., 1937. Determinationes In Hortum Siccum Joachimi Burseri: The Text of the 
Manuscript in the Linnaean Collections, ed. Spencer Savage, London, England, 
Printed for the Linnaean Society by Taylor and Francis. 
    
95 
Little, A., Wood, K., and McAdams, D., 1997. “Functional Analysis: A Fundamental 
Empirical Study for Reverse Engineering, Benchmarking and Redesign,” 
Proceedings of the ASME Design Theory and Methodology Conference, 
Sacramento, California. 
 
McAdams, D. and Wood, K., 1999. “Methods and Principles for Concurrent Functional 
Tolerance Design,” Proceedings of the 1999 ASME Design For Manufacturing 
Conference,” number 99-DETC/DFM49, Las Vegas, Nevada. 
 
McAdams, D. and Wood, K., 2000. “Quantitative Measures for Design by Analogy,” 
Proceedings of the 2000 ASME Design Theory and Methodology Conference, 
number DETC2000/DTM-14562, Baltimore, Maryland, September. 
 
McAdams, D., Stone, R., and Wood, K., 1999. “Functional Interdependence and Product 
Similarity Based on Customer Needs,'” The Journal of Research in Engineering 
Design, 11(1):1- 19. 
 
Miles, L., 1972, Techniques of Value Analysis Engineering, McGraw-Hill. 
 
Miller, Ryan, 2011. "Super Lightweight Tank Risk Management Case Study." NASA. 
Retrieved 22 June. 2011. <http://www.nasa.gov/externalflash/irkm-
slwt/index.html>. 
 
Moser, B., 2010. “Turbine Failure: Fine-tuning turbine gearbox performance,”  Retrieved 
February 23, 2012, from http://social.windenergyupdate.com/om/turbine-failure-
fine-tuning-turbine-gearbox-performance. 
 
Ombete, Kenneth, 2009. “Preventing chemical product failure.” Unpublished Thesis, 
University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, MO. 
 
Pahl, G. and Beitz, W., 1988. Engineering Design: A Systematic Approach, Springer-
Verlag. 
 
Patil, Rahul B., 2008. “Business risk in early design: an approach.”  Unpublished Thesis, 
University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, MO. 
 
Qiu, Y., Ge, P., & Yim, S. C., 2007. “Risk-Based Resource Allocation for Collaborative 
System Design in Distributed Environment.” Paper presented at the International 
Design Engineering Technical Conference, Las Vegas, NV, USA. 
 
Roberts, R. A., Stone, R. B. and Tumer, I. Y., 2002. “Deriving Function-Failure 
Information for Failure-Free Rotorcraft Component Design,” Proceedings of the 
2002 ASME Design Engineering Technical Conferences, Design for 
Manufacturing Conference, DETC2002/DFM-34166, Montreal, Canada.  
    
96 
Stock, M., Stone, R. and Tumer, I., 2003. “Going Back in Time to Improve Design: The 
Elemental Function-Failure Design Method,” Proceedings of DETC2003, 
DETC2003/DTM-48638, Chicago, IL. 
 
Stone, R., 1997. “Towards a Theory of Modular Design,” Doctoral Thesis, The 
University of Texas at Austin. 
 
Stone, R. and Wood, K., 1999. “Development of a Functional Basis for Design,” 
Proceedings of DETC99, DETC99/DTM-8765, Las Vegas, NV. 
 
Strawbridge, B., McAdams, D. and Stone, R., 2002. “A Computational Approach To 
Conceptual Design,” Proceedings of DETC2002, DETC2002/DTM-34001, 
Montreal, Canada. 
 
Tumer, I. Y., Stone, R. and Roberts, R. A., 2003. “Analysis of JPL's Problem and Failure 
Reporting Database,” Submitted to Proceedings of the 2003 ASME Design 
Engineering Technical Conference, Design for Manufacturing Conference, 
Chicago, IL.  
 
Tumer, I., Stone, R. and Bell, D., 2003. “Requirements for a Failure Mode Taxonomy for 
Use in Conceptual Design,” Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Engineering Design, ICED 03, Paper 1612, Stockholm, Sweden. 
 
Ullman, D. G., 2003.  The Mechanical Design Process.  3rd Edition. McGraw Hill, 
Boston. 
 
VAI (Value Analysis Incorporated), 1993. Value Analysis, Value Engineering, and Value 
Management, Clifton Park, New York. 
 
Wang J. X. and Roush M. L., 2000. What Every Engineer Should Know About Risk 
Engineering and Management. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc. 
 
Wilson R and Keil F, 1999. The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge, 
Mass: The MIT Press. 
 
 
    
97 
PAPER IV 
GENERATED RISK EVENT EFFECT NEUTRALIZATION:  IDENTIFYING 




Department of Mechanical Engineering 
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
Katie Grantham, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering 
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the design of new products and systems, the mitigation of potential failures is very 
important.  The sooner potential mitigation strategies can be employed, the lower the cost 
of those changes will be.  Still, there needs to be a means to generate and evaluate 
mitigation strategies to supplement the existing expertise of the designer.  By combining 
a mitigation strategy taxonomy with various rating strategies, a means to quickly select 
strategies and demonstrate their effect on the risk of failure can be obtained.  This paper 
explains the risk mitigation selection and evaluation methods, including the mapping 
calculations used to evaluate strategies and their use in a method to move from a 
functional model of a new product to a selection of mitigation strategies that can be 
compared, and select the best strategy for the product. 
    
98 
 
Keywords:  Risk Mitigation, Risk Analysis, Conceptual Design 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Scope  
During the design of a new product or system, the potential risk of failure is very 
important to consider.  The damages caused by the lack of consideration of potential 
failures can be great. However, by taking an interest in these risks at the earliest stages of 
the design process, the largest impact can be made at the least cost. 
There already exist several methods of determining potential failure modes in a product, 
such as Fault Tree Assessment, Event Tree Assessment, and the Risk in Early Design 
Method (RED) (Bedford and Cooke, 2001; W. E. Vesley, 1981; UNSRC, 1975; 
Grantham Lough, 2005). These methods, while providing what can go wrong with a 
product or system, do not address how that wrong can be avoided or made right. 
Currently, the creation and evaluation of risk mitigation strategies is an exercise left for 
the designer, and relying solely on their expertise and that of their team.  There needs to 
be a way to bridge this gap between the locating of potential failures, and the creation of 
strategies to mitigate those failures. 
Recently, there has been work on a mitigation strategy taxonomy, which collects 
strategies that were used to mitigate risks in products and systems (Krus and Grantham, 
2012).  While this taxonomy goes a long way towards allowing the risk mitigation 
process to be sped up and improved, it still lacks a means to evaluate individual strategies 
and select the best potential ones, still relying on the expertise of the designer to evaluate 
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the potential strategies. 
This paper seeks to present that step, the Generated Risk Event Effect 
Neutralization (GREEN) method, and demonstrate how this method can used to move 
from a list of risks generated during the conceptual design to a group of mitigation 
strategies, from which the best can be selected. 
 
1.2 Motivation and Applications  
In engineering, unplanned failures can be catastrophic for both the end user of the 
product and the company that produced the product. These failures need not be complex 
for them to have large consequences.  A simple design flaw in the accelerator of some of 
Toyota’s vehicles caused the accelerator to seize in place and cause uncontrolled 
acceleration caused 52 deaths and 32 injuries.  On top of this loss of life, the failures 
caused Toyota to recall 4.5 million vehicles and cost the company $900 million in 
repairs.  The damage to the company’s image also cost Toyota $155 million in lost 
business. All of this was caused when the design of the accelerator was changed from a 
mechanical accelerator (as had been used in all designs previous to this one) to an 
electrical accelerator.  The new design did not offer the resistance the human operators 
expected, so a friction plate was added to provide the resistance.  This new plate is what 
seized (Keane and Plungis, 2010; CBS.com, 2010). 
Planning for failure can be instrumental in resolving potential failures.  However, 
this planning has a greater effect when performed before the risk materializes.  The 
cleanup from the Deepwater Horizon oilrig operated by British Petroleum developed 
many strategies for dealing with the oil spill after the failure occurred.  From April 24 
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through September 21, 15 different mitigation strategies were attempted in an effort to 
close the well with limited degrees of success (Garudian.co.uk, 2010).  By identifying 
this potential risk beforehand, these strategies could have been tested and evaluated in a 
controlled setting, and react to the failure with a proven strategy at a faster pace. 
However, with proper planning, risks can be mitigated. The Fukushima nuclear 
reactors provide an example of successful risk mitigation in action. Like most nuclear 
reactors used today, the Fukushima reactors were designed with the principle of defense-
in-depth; that is, by designing multiple, different, redundant strategies for greater than the 
worst possible scenario. Everything from the design of the reactor and fuel rods to the use 
of boric acid and sea water to cool the overheating reactor was a plan put in place from 
the beginning of design, and helped prevent a major disaster from turning into an even 
larger one (World Nuclear Association, 2011). 
To follow this example, the GREEN method seeks to provide a means to 
determine potential mitigation strategies as early as possible in the design process, to 
allow these strategies to be worked into the design of the product, and allow for the 
maximum amount of testing before releasing the product to the public.  Starting from the 
functional model of the product, GREEN uses generated failure modes provided by the 
RED method to suggest mitigation strategies from a collected taxonomy, and then rate 
those strategies based on historical data. 
This will allow designers to focus on the risks inherent to a product from the very 
beginning of the design process, and making risk mitigation integral to the design.  
Further, it allows designers to supplement their already existing engineering expertise 
with the collected historical knowledge contained within the mitigation strategy 





2.1 Risk Mitigation Theories and Methods 
Risk mitigation is the process of generating strategies to remove risks from a 
system, limit remaining risks, and monitor and control the remaining risks (Wang and 
Roush, 2000).  While the primary means of risk mitigation remains the use of expert 
knowledge, there are several different methods that are used to aid this process.  These 
methods assist the process by helping to organize the created strategies or compare 
different strategies and determine the best potential one. 
 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a risk analysis tool that has risk 
mitigation as one of its steps.  For a given product, all risks to be considered are listed 
out, the corresponding component identified, and then rated according to the occurrence, 
severity, and detection, which are then combined into a risk priority number.  Each item 
on the list is also given a potential solution that can be used to mitigate the failure 
(Department of Defense, 1949). Recent advancements in FMEA make it better suited for 
use during conceptual design (Grantham Lough, 2007), however, this does not 
completely remove its subjectivity.  Further, for the mitigation of the individual failure 
modes, there are no guidelines, relying only on the expertise of the on performing the 
analysis.   
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a means used to measure a strategy based on it 
perceived costs of execution and the benefits gained from implementing the strategy.  
Each strategy is evaluated based on the cost of putting it into action, usually converted to 
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a monetary amount.  Then, the benefits, again converted to a monetary value, are 
evaluated.  Then these values are compared across multiple strategies to determine which 
strategies give the best net gain.  While this is the current method of comparing 
mitigation strategies, some costs and benefits, such as human life and health are difficult 
to quantify (Nas, 1996). 
Some reliability prediction strategies, such as penalty functions, try to reduce risk 
by guiding the design toward the minimum risk.  Using penalty functions alongside 
genetic algorithms, systems and products can be designed to maximize reliability and 
minimize cost, iterating designs until the most reliable products are designed (Coit and 
Smith, 1996). This method does not generate strategies as much as it tries to develop a 
design that minimizes the risk, limiting the choice of the designer.  
 Along the same line is the system reliability prioritization method, which uses the 
uncertainty of analysis methods to identify what portions of a design need additional 
analysis or refinement (Coit, 2000).  This method focuses the mitigation on the 
components that are at the least understood or at the highest risk, driving the mitigation of 
the part to the parts that have the highest need.  However, like the penalty functions, no 
actual strategies are generated, leaving the actual mitigation strategies developed and 
used to the designer. 
 More recently, the risk-based resource allocation methodology (R-DRAM) 
provides a means to allocate resources across a system to maximize risk reduction for a 
given budget.  R-DRAM identifies the risk across all shareholders and then evaluates the 
probabilities for all of those risks consistently.  Using these probabilities and the CBA of 
spending a given amount of resources on a given mitigation strategy, it evaluates the best 
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possible combination of strategies for dealing with a given risk (Qiu, Ge, and Yim, 2007).  
This method focuses on the most efficient expenditure of resources, not necessarily the 
highest risk items, and still relies on the designer to provide the mitigation strategies that 
will be used in the analysis. 
 The antiterrorism risk-based decision aid (ARDA) provides a means of risk 
mitigation tailored to the mitigation of potential terrorist attacks.  This method collects 
the locations and facilities that may be at risk, and what the expected losses (costs) in 
terms of lives lost, values of facilities, and costs of repairs, and finally, the likelihood of 
an attack at that location.  Using all of this data, various mitigation strategies are assessed 
and compared based on how much they reduce the cost of those terrorist incidents (Dillon 
Liebe, Bestafka, 2009).  ARDA provides a solid means to evaluate strategies, but requires 
a fully developed system and a great deal of historical data in order to use properly.  
Further, like all of the above methods, it does not generate strategies, leaving it up to the 
designer to determine what strategies to evaluate. 
Another way to handle potential risks during concept generation is the Theory of 
Inventive Problem Solving (TIPS).  This design method was generated from studying 
millions of patents to determine trends in product design.  From these trends, TIPS 
presents a set of generalized parameters for describing product metrics, and strategies for 
resolving conflicts between those parameters (Altshuller, 1984).  When using TIPS, the 
engineer evaluates conflicts that exist in the product design, and then those conflicts 
stated as contradictions between two of the 39 parameters defined.  That conflict then 
lists which of the 40 design principles are applicable to the conflict.  These design 
principles can then be used to improve a design, and effectively resolve the conflict (Otto 
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and Wood, 2001).   
A final method is one that uses not CBA to evaluate a mitigation strategy, but 
instead uses the system or product in production to test out mitigation strategies.  
Adaptive management generates policies to handle a given risk, and puts those policies 
into practice.  If the policy works, then it can continue to be used to mitigate a particular 
risk.  If it fails to address the risk, it can be adapted or replaced to meet with the changing 
requirements (Brody, et al., 2009).  This system relies heavily on expert opinion and 
record keeping of the effects of past mitigation strategies.  Further, it requires a 
developed system, making it unsuitable for conceptual design. 
 For risk mitigation during conceptual design, a method that generates mitigation 
strategies while only requiring a functional model of the product is quite advantageous, 
allowing for failure mitigation to be added to the system from the very beginning, before 
the physical design solution has been finalized.  Further, the ability to rate those 
mitigation strategies based on their past performance would allow the designer to select 
the best possible mitigations for the given design.  The GREEN method seeks to meet 
these requirements, filling gaps not covered by other methods, and supplementing the 
expert opinion normally called upon.  However, before risk mitigation can move into 
using GREEN, the potential product risks need to be identified.  For this purpose, the 
mitigation process in the conceptual design starts with the RED method. 
 
2.2 The Risk in Early Design Method 
The Risk in Early Design Method (RED) is a risk analysis tool designed to 
determine potential failure modes and their risk when given only a functional model 
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(Grantham Lough, 2005).  RED has its basis in the Function Failure Design Method 
(Stock, Stone, Tumer, 2003), a means of connecting historical product failures to the 
functions those components performed. First, a collected knowledge base linking 
components to failure modes is made.  This knowledge base is collected from historical 
failure reports, and compiled into a database listing the number of times a given 
component from the component taxonomy has failed by a given failure mode.  This is the 
Component Failure Matrix (CF matrix). 
 A second matrix is also collected, using a collection of products and functional 
models to determine the connections between given functions and a component.  This 
matrix simply lists if a component has ever solved a particular function.  This is the 
Function-Component Matrix (EC matrix). 
 These two matrices are multiplied together (EC x CF = EF), to create the Function 
Failure Matrix.  This new matrix provides the number of times a function has failed by a 
given failure mode.  RED takes this basis from FFDM and adds the ability to calculate 
the likelihood and consequence of risk (Grantham Lough, 2005). 
 First, an additional matrix, the CF’ matrix is created, where instead of the number 
of times a component has failed, the severity of the failure is recorded instead.  This 
severity scale is a set of values, ranked from 1 to 5 based on a scale used by Wang and 
Rousch (2000), that determines the consequence of the risk for a given failure.  This is 
combined with the EC matrix to determine the severity of failure for a given function and 
failure mode. 
 Second, a list of functions taken from a functional model is used to select the 
functions for the RED analysis.  These functions are used to select the values from the EF 
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matrix and EC,CF’ matrix to perform calculations on.  These calculations are based on 
different mappings of the EF and EC,CF’ matrices.  The likelihood mappings L1 and L2 
normalize the number of times a failure has occurred to an integer value between 0 and 5, 
based on either the functions in the product (L1) or the entire database (L2).  L1 is useful 
for subsystem level analysis, comparing the likelihood only against other subsystems in 
the product; L2 is useful for system level analysis as it compares the likelihood against 
the entire database.  Similarly, the consequence mappings C1 and C2 are appropriate for 
a human -centric (C1) and unmanned systems (C2).  C1 take the worst case scenario for 
the given consequences, making it well suited when humans are involved.  C2 averaged 
the values based on the function-failures that had recorded values, focusing on the low to 
mid range of values that deal with unmanned products (Grantham Lough, 2005). 
 Once the mappings are selected for the given analysis, those mappings are used to 
calculate the likelihood and consequence values for each combination of function and 
failure mode in the knowledge base.  These results are then presented in two forms:  a list 
of function failure mode pairs and their corresponding likelihood and consequence 
values, and a fever chart that lists the number of failures that occurred at a given 
combination of likelihood and consequence (Grantham Lough, 2005).  
 The RED method allows for risk analysis to be performed during conceptual 
design, and even by novice designers with minimal risk analysis experience.  However, to 
move from this analysis to mitigation strategies, a historical knowledgebase of strategies, 
similar to RED’s matrices, needs to exist.  This is met by the mitigation strategy 
taxonomy. 
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2.3 The Risk Mitigation Strategy Taxonomy 
The risk mitigation strategy taxonomy is a collection of 42 electromechanical risk 
mitigation strategies that was derived from 325 case studies from industry handbooks and 
corporate data (Krus and Grantham, 2012).  The risk mitigation strategy taxonomy is a 
tool that defines mitigation strategies based on the changes they perform on the product, 
and what they make those changes to.  These strategies are in verb-object form, with the 
object taken from the functional basis (Stone and Wood, 1999) and the object empirically 
determined from the analysis of the case studies. 
The mitigation strategy taxonomy was based on the study of models used simulate 
different failure modes.  These models were studied to determine the parameters that an 
engineer could directly modify and use to control risk due to those failure modes (Krus 
and Grantham, 2010).  Expanding on the two categories of parameters and work on 
evaluating risk elements (Grantham et al., 2009), a linguistic means for evaluating 
mitigation strategies was developed, using six attributes to measure how well a mitigation 
strategy conveyed information (Krus and Grantham, 2011).  These lead to the creation of 
the mitigation strategy taxonomy, using the attributes from the linguistic analysis to 
collect information on mitigation strategies and categorize them into 42 different 
strategies (Krus and Grantham, 2012). 
The risk mitigation strategy taxonomy allows information on mitigation strategies 
to be collected and categorized.  Because the mitigation strategy has consistently defined 
strategies, data from mitigation practices can be stored together, and used to generate 
strategies for new products (Krus and Grantham, 2012).  Using risks determined by a risk 
analysis method, such as RED, the taxonomy can be used to generate mitigation 
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strategies based on the failure modes of those risks.  These generated strategies can then 
be evaluated based on the product they are being generated for, using the engineer’s 
experience to further select and refine the strategies (Krus and Grantham, 2012).  
 This process can be further enhanced.  By having a standardized taxonomy of 
mitigation strategies, mappings can be performed on collected information on those 
strategies similar to the RED method, allowing the rating of how a mitigation strategy 
affects different risks.  In the next section, the mitigation strategy taxonomy will be used 
to demonstrate how using failure mode data from a RED analysis, the information in the 
mitigation taxonomy can be used to select potential mitigation strategies and evaluate 
their effects on the failure modes. 
 
3 THE GREEN METHOD 
 The Generated Risk Event Effect Neutralization (GREEN) method is a series of 
steps that lead from a risk analysis from RED to a set of risk mitigations that can be 
compared, to identify the best strategy for the given situation.  The GREEN method can 
be broken down into linking the mitigation strategies with failure modes, comparing the 
strategies, and then selecting the best strategies.  This process is illustrated in Figure 1.  
GREEN starts with a functional model, which is then used to perform a RED analysis.  
This provides the list of function-failure mode pairs that will be used to determine 
potential mitigation strategies.  Next, the potential mitigation strategies are determined by 
using the GREEN matrices.  These matrices contain information on potential failure 
modes and their parameters, parameters that have been changed by mitigation strategies, 
and the likelihood and consequence changes for a given mitigation strategy. Finally, 
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ratings are generated for the mitigation strategies based on the original likelihood and 
consequence of risk, the changes to the likelihood and consequence taken from the 
knowledge base, and the popularity from how frequently the strategy has been used.  
These ratings can then be evaluated, and the mitigation strategies that best fit the product 




























































































Failure Mode 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0
Failure Mode 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Failure Mode 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
Failure Mode 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
Failure Mode 5 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
Failure Mode 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Failure Mode 7 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0





New Likelihood New Consequence Popularity
Mitigation Strategy 1 4.5 1.9 1
Mitigation Strategy 2 3.2 1.7 3
Mitigation Strategy 3 4.1 1.4 4
Mitigation Strategy 4 4.9 1.3 3
Mitigation Strategy 5 3.5 1.6 2
Mitigation Strategy 6 4.3 1.7 2
Mitigation Strategy 7 4.7 1.9 4
Mitigation Strategy 8 3.6 1.1 5






Figure 1.  The GREEN Method  
 
3.1 Linking Failure Modes to Mitigation Strategies 
The GREEN method starts from a collection of function-failure mode pairs, as 
taken from a RED analysis.  These pairs have a function, failure mode, likelihood of risk, 
and a consequence of risk.  To start the method, the failure mode is used to find the 
appropriate links to mitigation strategies using the parameters the failure modes and 
mitigation strategies have in common.  As proposed by Krus and Grantham (2010), the 
models for a failure mode are made up of parameters.  By using those parameters, 
mitigation strategies that have corresponding design and environment parameters can be 
selected from the taxonomy.   
    
110 
To perform this linking, matrices linking the failure modes to parameters (FP) 
and the parameters to mitigation strategies (PS) need to be created. The FP matrix should 
be a m by n matrix, where m is the number failure modes and n is the number of 
mitigation strategies.  Similarly, the PS matrix should be a n by s matrix, where s is the 
number of mitigation strategies. In the FP matrix’s case, the entries are binary, recording 
which failure modes have corresponded to which parameters, with a 1 representing the 
failure mode is affected by that parameter, and 0 representing the parameter having no 
baring on the failure mode.  The PS matrix, on the other hand, is incremented based on 
the number of times a mitigation strategy has altered a given parameter.  Once these two 
matrices have been created, they can be multiplied together to create the Failure Mode-
Mitigation strategy matrix (FP x PS  = FS), which shows failure modes, which 
mitigation strategies are applicable, and how frequently the mitigation strategy have been 
used to answer a failure mode.  An example of the FP, PS, and FS matrices is shown 
below in Figure 2. 
    
111 
 
Figure 2.  Linking the Mitigation Strategies to the Failure Modes (FP, PS, and FS 
Matrices) 
 
A fourth matrix, the Mitigation Strategy Likelihood-Consequence (SC), collects 
the likelihood and consequence changes for each mitigation strategies.  This matrix is a s 
by 2 matrix, with the likelihood and consequence recorded for each strategy.  
These matrices can be created for any division of the mitigation strategy taxonomy or for 
the entire taxonomy, as needed.  Again, this work focuses on electromechanical 
mitigation strategies.  By selecting different types of strategies, a designer can focus the 
mitigation of a risk in a particular direction. 
 
3.2 Comparing the Strategies 
As shown in the previous section. each function-failure mode pair can be linked to 
several potential mitigation strategies from the mitigation strategy taxonomy.  However, 
there is nothing differentiating these strategies from each other.  In order to aid in 
evaluating the strategies, there needs to be a means to compare these strategies. 
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 In order to evaluate these strategies, the only pieces of numerical data that can be 
used are the original likelihood and consequence of risk from the function-failure mode 
pair and the likelihood and consequence changes, and the number of times a strategy has 
been encountered.  Using these five pieces of numerical data, ways to calculate the 
likelihood and consequence of the function-failure mode pair after the mitigation strategy 
has been applied, as well as the popularity of the mitigation strategy will be developed. 
To design these equations, first, English sentences were made by stating exactly 
what each of the calculations was to be.  Those sentences were then translated into 
mathematical terminology, using the available variables, such as the original likelihood 
and consequence and the likelihood and consequence changes from the risk mitigation 
strategy knowledge base.  The following sections detail the derivation and use of the 
calculations for the new likelihood, new consequence, and the popularity of the 
mitigation strategy. 
 
3.2.1 New Likelihood Calculation.  The new likelihood calculation gives the 
new likelihood of failure for a function after employing the mitigation strategy to reduce 
the risk.  This calculation takes the original risk due to likelihood, supplied from RED, 
and uses the likelihood change stored in the mitigation strategy taxonomy to calculate a 
new likelihood of failure.  When developing the equation for this calculation, the 
sentence “The new likelihood is the original likelihood lowered by the change in 
likelihood.”  This sentence can be translated into the equation (1): 
 
€ 
Lnew = Loriginal (1− Lchange )  (1) 
 In this equation, Loriginal is the original likelihood due to risk, Lchange is the 
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likelihood change taken from the failure mitigation knowledge base, and Lnew is the new 
likelihood of failure after the mitigation strategy. Loriginal,, taken from the RED analysis is 
an integer value from 1 to 5, and Lchange is a percent change between 0 and 1 taken from 
the SC matrix, which creates a Lnew that is a decimal value between 0 and 5. 
 
3.2.2 New Consequence Calculation.  The new consequence calculation gives 
the new risk due to consequence after employing the mitigation strategy to reduce the 
risk.  Similarly to the new likelihood calculation, it take the original consequence and 
uses the consequence change supplied by the strategy knowledge base to calculate the 
new consequence.  The sentence, again, is almost identical to the one used by the new 
likelihood calculation: “The new consequence is the original consequence lowered by the 
change in consequence.”  This sentence gives equation (2). 
 
€ 
Cnew = Coriginal 1−Cchange( ) (2) 
In this equation, Coriginal is the original likelihood due to risk, Cchange is the 
consequence change taken from the failure mitigation knowledge base, and Cnew is the 
new consequence of failure after the mitigation strategy. As above, Coriginal,, taken from 
the RED analysis is an integer value from 1 to 5, and Cchange is a percent change between 
0 and 1 taken from the SC matrix, which creates a Cnew that is a decimal value between 0 
and 5. 
 
3.2.3 Popularity.  The popularity measure evaluated how frequently a given 
mitigation strategy has been encountered, and thus, how popular it is to use in industry.  
This is useful as the popularity of the mitigation strategy may contain information that the 
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likelihood and consequence reductions may not capture, such as a lower cost or easier 
implementation.  To derive this equation, the sentence “The popularity of a mitigation 
strategy is the normalized ratio of the number of occurrences of this strategy to the 
greatest number of occurrences of all strategies in the knowledge base.”  This sentence, 
when translated, yields equation (3). 
  
€ 












   (3) 
 In this equation, Ni is the number of occurrences for the ith mitigation strategy, as 
found in the FS matrix.  This equation gives a normalized integer from 1 to 5 based on 
how many occurrences a given strategy has had, compared to the number of occurrences 
the most seen strategy has.  This rating is based purely on the number of times a given 
strategy has been encountered and recorded in the database. 
 
3.3 Selecting the Mitigation Strategy  
Once the mitigation strategies have been rated, they must be compared and the 
best mitigation strategy(s) must be selected.  This can be accomplished in a number of 
ways. For a single function-failure mode pair, each of the individual applicable strategies 
can be looked at and compared based on their new likelihood and consequence ratings, as 
well as the popularity rating, and selecting the best strategy purely on straight 
comparison.  Conversely, if the same mitigation strategy appears for several different 
function-failure mode pairs, it would rate higher than strategies that only appeared for a 
single function-failure mode pair but otherwise had the same ratings.  At this point, the 
engineering expertise paired with the output from GREEN is used to select the best 
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mitigation strategies for the product. 
 
4 AN EXAMPLE OF GREEN 
Presented here is an example of the GREEN method applied to a design problem.  
In this example, the product being designed is a new wind turbine, based on case studies 
not included in the current GREEN knowledge base.  This will be compared to the 
mitigation strategies recommended by the case study, to verify the GREEN method’s 
results. 
In order to perform a GREEN risk mitigation, first there needs to be a functional 
model of the product.  Shown below in Figure 3 is a functional model of a wind turbine.  
This model contains 15 different functions, taking in gas (the wind), kinetic energy (the 
movement of the wind), and a status signal (the wind direction), and exporting the gas 
and electrical energy. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Wind Turbine Functional Model 
  
Using this functional model, a RED analysis is performed on the functional 
model.  For this particular example, the L1 C2 mapping will be used, as the failure of the 
individual subsystems was desired, and it will be operating far away from humans and is 
thus unmanned.  Shown below in Figure 4 and Table 1 are the fever chart and the highest 
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risk (high and moderate risk) elements from the analysis.  As can be seen from this 
analysis, there is 1 high-risk element, 7 moderate risk elements, and 48 low risk elements.  
For this assessment, the 8 highest risk elements will be focused on. 
The 8 highest risk elements pertain to the failure modes “high cycle fatigue,” 
“impact fracture,” “thermal shock,” and “yielding.”  Five of the 8 function-failure mode 
pairs are focused on high cycle fatigue, while 1 of each is focused on the three other 
failure modes.  Of these, only thermal shock has no data currently in the knowledge base, 
and so will be excluded from this analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Wind Turbine RED Analysis Fever Chart 
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Table 1. Wind Turbine RED Analysis High Risk Results 
Transfer Mechanical Energy fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (4, 4) 
Import Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Guide Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Export Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Transfer Mechanical energy fails due to Impact Fracture (5, 1) 
Regulate Mechanical energy fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 1) 
Regulate Mechanical energy fails due to Thermal Shock (5, 1) 
Transfer Mechanical energy fails due to Yielding (4, 2) 
 
The next step is to determine the potential mitigation strategies.  Turning to the 
FS matrix made from the current set of failure mode models and mitigation strategy 
taxonomy, the potential mitigation strategies applicable to the mitigation of the above 
four failure modes can be found.  Shown below in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are the collection of 
mitigation strategies provided by the FS matrix with the number of occurrences, as well 
as the likelihood and consequence changes provided from the SC matrix (YES and NO 
are shown where there is no numerical data, but it is known that the mitigation strategy 
had an effect).  There were 20 mitigation strategies for high cycle fatigue, 14 for impact 
fracture, and 15 for yielding.  While there is overlap between the three mitigation 
strategies, the number of occurrences changes for each failure mode, which will lead to 
different popularity ratings for the different failure modes. 
Currently, due to lack of numerical data, only convert material and convert part 
have a numerical value for their likelihood and consequence change values.  The 
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objective of this paper is to demonstrate the method, not to provide an exhaustive list of 
consequence and likelihood change values.  In future work, this problem will be 
addressed. 
 
Table 2. Mitigation Strategies for High Cycle Fatigue, with Number of Occurrences, 








Change Natural Frequency 1 NO YES
Condition Material 4 NO YES
Condition Part 3 NO YES
Convert Material 8 4% 4%
Convert Part 4 NO 2%
Couple Part 1 NO YES
Decrease Motion 1 NO YES
Decrease Power Assist 1 NO YES
Import Lubricant 1 NO YES
Import Material 1 NO YES
Import Part 1 NO YES
Import Stress 1 NO YES
Increase Controls 2 YES YES
Increase Flow 1 NO YES
Remove Part 1 YES YES
Secure Part 4 YES YES
Separate Contaminant 1 NO YES
Shape Part 14 NO YES
Stabilize Process 1 NO YES
Stop Process 1 NO YES  
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Table 3. Mitigation Strategies for Impact Fracture, with Number of Occurrences, 








Condition Material 4 NO YES
Condition Part 5 NO YES
Convert Material 5 4% 4%
Convert Part 4 NO 2%
Decrease Power Assist 1 NO YES
Import Lubricant 1 NO YES
Increase Controls 2 YES YES
Increase Flow 1 NO YES
Position Part 1 NO YES
Remove Part 1 YES YES
Separate Contaminant 1 NO YES
Shape Part 8 NO YES
Stabalize Flow 1 NO YES
Stabilize Process 1 NO YES  
 
Table 4. Mitigation Strategies for Yielding, with Number of Occurrences, Likelihood, 








Condition Material 5 NO YES
Condition Part 4 NO YES
Convert Material 4 4% 4%
Convert Part 2 NO 2%
Couple Part 1 NO YES
Decrease Load 1 NO YES
Decrease Motion 1 NO YES
Decrease Torque 1 NO YES
Import Lubricant 4 NO YES
Increase Controls 2 YES YES
Increase Load 1 NO YES
Increase Torque 1 NO YES
Position Part 1 NO YES
Secure Part 1 YES YES
Shape Part 10 NO YES  
 
Using this data, the popularity, new likelihood, and new consequence values are 
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calculated, to use in comparing the strategies.  For each of these strategies, the likelihood 
change and consequence change values are used to determine the new likelihood and 
consequence for each failure mode, and the number of occurrences are used to evaluate 
the popularity.  As an example here, the strategies Convert Material and Convert Part and 
the function-failure mode pair “transfer mechanical energy fails due to high cycle 
fatigue” will be used to show the calculations for popularity as well as the new likelihood 
and consequence values, as their likelihood and consequence change data has been 
collected from real world data. 
For the popularity, shown in equations (4) and (5), the number of occurrences for 
convert material is 8, and 4 for convert part.  In both cases, the maximum number of 
occurrences belongs to shape part, with 14.  Evaluating these values, the popularity for 
these two functions is X and Y, respectively.  
 
€ 
























For the first function-failure mode pair, transfer mechanical energy failing due to 
high cycle fatigue, the likelihood of risk is 4 and the consequence is 4.  Shown in 
equations (6) and (7) are the calculations and results for the likelihood and consequence 
of applying the convert material strategy.  Similarly, equation (8) shows the process for 
convert part.  There is no calculation for the new consequence of convert part, as that 
strategy does not reduce the consequence.  As shown in the equations below, the new 
likelihood and consequence values are very close to the original likelihood and 
consequence of risk.  While this does show which has a higher reduction of the risk, the 
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LConvert _Material = 4 • (1− .04) = 3.84  (6) 
 
€ 
CConvert _Material = 4 • (1− .04) = 3.84  (7) 
 
€ 
LConvert _ Part = 4 • (1− .02) = 3.92  (8) 
Following these examples, the process is repeated for each mitigation strategy and 
each function failure mode pair.  Shown below in tables 5, 6, and 7, are the results for the 
function transfer mechanical energy failing due to high cycle fatigue, impact fracture, and 
yielding.  Similar tables can be constructed for each of the other function-failure mode 
pairs. 
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Change Natural Frequency 1 4 <4
Condition Material 2 4 <4
Condition Part 2 4 <4
Convert Material 3 3.84 3.84
Convert Part 2 4 3.92
Couple Part 1 4 <4
Decrease Motion 1 4 <4
Decrease Power Assist 1 4 <4
Import Lubricant 1 4 <4
Import Material 1 4 <4
Import Part 1 4 <4
Import Stress 1 4 <4
Increase Controls 1 <4 <4
Increase Flow 1 4 <4
Remove Part 1 <4 <4
Secure Part 2 <4 <4
Separate Contaminant 1 4 <4
Shape Part 5 4 <4
Stabilize Process 1 4 <4
Stop Process 1 4 <4  
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Condition Material 3 5 <1
Condition Part 4 5 <1
Convert Material 4 4.8 0.96
Convert Part 3 5 0.98
Decrease Power Assist 1 5 <1
Import Lubricant 1 5 <1
Increase Controls 2 <5 <1
Increase Flow 1 5 <1
Position Part 1 5 <1
Remove Part 1 <5 <1
Separate Contaminant 1 5 <1
Shape Part 5 5 <1
Stabalize Flow 1 5 <1
Stabilize Process 1 5 <1  
 






Condition Material 3 4 <2
Condition Part 2 4 <2
Convert Material 2 3.84 1.92
Convert Part 1 4 1.96
Couple Part 1 4 <2
Decrease Load 1 4 <2
Decrease Motion 1 4 <2
Decrease Torque 1 4 <2
Import Lubricant 2 4 <2
Increase Controls 1 <4 <2
Increase Load 1 4 <2
Increase Torque 1 4 <2
Position Part 1 4 <2
Secure Part 1 <4 <2
Shape Part 5 4 <2  
 
The final step is determining which of these results is best for the chosen failure 
modes.  For this example, popularity, new consequence, and new likelihood have been 
determined for the failure modes corresponding to transfer mechanical energy.  For all 
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three failure modes, the most popular strategy is “shape part,” where the geometry of the 
part is altered to better reduce the risk.  However, another high popularity choice affects 
both the consequence and likelihood, “convert material.”  This strategy replaces the 
material with a different material better suited to resisting the failure.  Finally, both of 
these strategies are applicable to all three failure modes, meaning that they can applied to 
handle all three potential risks.  Thus, for this case, the best selection from GREEN is 
“convert material.” 
These results were compared to a pair of cases studies that reported recommended 
and successful mitigation strategies applied to currently operating wind turbines.  
Manwell, et al. (1999) examined potential failures in a wind turbines gearbox, which is a 
solution to transfer mechanical energy in the presented functional model.  This report 
showed that the gearbox was susceptible to impact fracture, and recommended using 
improved 1st stage carriers with spherical bearings, improving the retention by using a 
tighter fit or a locking mechanism, and adding a teeter damper to the design.  These 
strategies correspond to “convert part,” “position part,” and “import part” in the 
mitigation taxonomy.  As shown in Table 6, GREEN was able to predict two of these 
strategies, “convert part” and “position part.” 
The second case study reported solutions used in the field as maintenance for 
turbines improve (Moser, 2010).  This report mentioned failures in the gearbox have been 
mitigated by lubrication, tapered roller bearings, and refined material processing.  These 
strategies are represented by “import lubricant,” “convert part,” and “condition material.”  
All three of these strategies were generated by GREEN, with “condition material” being 
the second highest recommended strategy for yielding. 
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As shown by these examples, GREEN can generate useful mitigation strategies 
for a given function-failure mode pair, and can accurately produce strategies determined 
by engineering experience. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper demonstrated the GREEN method, and provided an example of how to 
perform this method from a design standpoint.  The GREEN method allows a designer to 
approach the mitigation of risks during the earliest stages of the design process.  By using 
the mitigation strategy taxonomy as a basis, it allows historical risk mitigation data to be 
used to generate mitigation strategies for a new design product.  Also, due to its 
functional nature, it can be used across disciplines, as long as the design can be broken 
down into a functional model. 
However, as shown in the calculations of the example, the current means of 
recording risk changes have small changes barely affect the risk as reported by RED.  
This needs to be rectified, and a means of capturing and evaluating likelihood and 
consequence change data needs to be defined to allow for more accurate measuring of the 
affect of a mitigation strategy on a risk. 
 
5.1 Future Work  
In the future, a means to evaluate the likelihood and consequence changes of the 
mitigation strategies needs to be developed, to allow for maximum use of the GREEN 
method.  In addition, more strategies need to be added to the taxonomy, to increase the 
accuracy of the popularity data and the number of different strategies that are available.  
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Finally, a means to evaluate the consequence and likelihood reduction of a mitigation 
strategy needs to be determined. 
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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to introduce the method to add mitigation strategy data to 
the Generated Risk Event Effect Neutralization (GREEN) method knowledgebase, to 
improve its ability to effectively mitigate risks.  Risk mitigation is the creation and 
selection of mitigation strategies to reduce, measure, or control risks in a system.  
Currently, the vast majority of risk mitigation strategies are created based on the 
engineering expertise of the engineers on a project.  The Generated Risk Event Effect 
Neutralization (GREEN) method provides a means for an engineer to supplement their 
experience by generating risk mitigation strategies based on past successful risk 
mitigation strategies using the failure modes of the potential risks that the product faces.  
In order to better aid the engineer in selecting the best possible risk mitigation strategy 
for a particular risk, more information on mitigation strategies need to be catalogued in 
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the GREEN knowledgebase.  This paper outlines and demonstrates the method for adding 
new data on mitigation strategies to the knowledgebase, and presents a case study of how 
this information is added and used to mitigate product risks. 
 
Keywords  Risk Mitigation, Failure Analysis, Risk Linguistics 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to introduce the method to add mitigation strategy 
data to the Generated Risk Event Effect Neutralization (GREEN) method 
knowledgebase, to improve its ability to effectively mitigate risks.  The GREEN method 
is a tool that aids in performing risk mitigation by generating risk mitigation strategies 
and evaluating them based on collected historical risk mitigation data (Krus and 
Grantham, 2012a).  As GREEN was designed for use during the earliest stages of the 
design process, it can aid the engineer in reducing or eliminating the unplanned failures a 
product might experience. 
Unplanned failure is a problem in all fields of engineering, and if not addressed, 
can lead to disasters, loss of life, and loss of money.  The recalls performed by Toyota are 
just one such case where these unplanned failures caused a great loss of life and 
resources.  A design flaw in the accelerator pedal caused the vehicle to accelerate 
uncontrollably, and lead to the deaths of 52 individuals and injured 32 others.  
Approximately 4.5 million vehicles were recalled, and cost the company almost $900 
million in repairs and $155 million in lost business (CBS.com, 2010). 
Risk mitigation is the creation of strategies to limit risk, plan for potential 
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emergencies, and measuring and controlling any remaining risks in the system (Wang 
and Roush, 2000).  These strategies reduce or remove risk from a system, either by 
reducing the likelihood or consequence of risk or transferring the risk to a different, less 
vital system.  They can also be plans for when the product fails, as well as measuring the 
remaining risks that cannon be removed (Wang and Roush, 2000).  These plans are 
primarily created using the experience and expertise of the engineers that generated the 
strategies. 
The GREEN method is tool that can aid an engineer in performing risk mitigation, 
but for it to be more effective, additional information on successful mitigation strategies 
need to be added to it.  By adding additional information to GREEN’s knowledgebase, it 
will better reflect the practice of industry, and allow for more accurate calculations when 
used to evaluate the strategies. 
 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Linguistic Terminology 
  Risk mitigation strategies are primarily developed by the engineers on a project, 
drawing from their own expertise and experience to generate potential solutions to risks.  
However, due to this, not all risk mitigation strategies are communicated the same way.  
This can create difficulty when attempting to store information on past mitigation 
strategies, as well as employing those strategies in new products. 
The communication of these strategies, as well as storage of information related to 
them, is very important when attempting to mitigate risks in a product.  Attempting to 
understand a mitigation strategy employed on an earlier product can be confusing if both 
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groups did not use a common vocabulary when defining and describing the strategies.  To 
help resolve this issue, as well as improve storage of knowledge about mitigation 
strategies, the risk mitigation strategy taxonomy was created (Krus and Grantham, 
2012b).  This taxonomy has its roots in the functional basis, component taxonomy, and 
failure mode taxonomy. 
 
2.1.1 Functional Basis and Other Taxonomies.  The functional basis, formerly 
the functional taxonomy, is an attempt to create a standard language for discussing 
functions, the terms that are used to conceptualize, define, or understand a product in 
terms of function and purpose (Stone and Wood, 1999).  There have been several 
attempts to formalize this list of definitions, dating back to the 1940s (Akiyama, 1991, 
Miles, 1972, VAI, 1993).  Collins, et al. created a list of 105 functions that describe the 
mechanical functions of a helicopter, as well as store failure information (1976), which 
lead the way for later attempts.  Later attempts tried to add structure and origination, by 
suggesting breaking the functions and flows into groups and classes based on a variety of 
methods, such as living systems theory or a departure from the verb-object format (Pahl 
and Beitz, 1988, Hundal, Koch et al., 1990, Kirschman and Fadel, 1998).  The functional 
basis refined the categories of Pahl and Beitz, using the empirical study of over 100 
products to add two more levels of detail (Kirschman and Fadel, 1998, Little, Wood, and 
McAdams, 1997).  This basis has undergone additional revision since then, adding 
definitions for the flows (Stone, 1997), and being used for product similarity 
computations (McAdams, Stone, and Wood, 1999), design by analogy (McAdams and 
Wood, 2000), and functional tolerancing (McAdams and Wood, 1999). 
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The component taxonomy attempts to do for product components what the 
functional basis did for functions, and creates a naming convention for mechanical parts 
(Kurtoglu, et al., 2005).  This was developed as a way to abstract a component down to a 
high level name to simplify information transfer, and help with concept generation during 
the conceptual phase of design.  This taxonomy is based on the concept of a lexicon, 
which assumes that every artifact has a specific purpose to fulfill (Chenhall, 1978).  The 
names were divided into four categories:  Functional Form, where the name is based on 
the function the component performs; geometric shapes, where the name is based on the 
shape of the component; simple mechanics, where the names are based on the seven 
simple machines; and Nature, where the names are based on similar things found in 
nature.  Using these four categories, 114 terms were collected from various literature and 
technical publications, as well as the expertise of the creators (Greer, et al., 2003).  Using 
this taxonomy alongside such tools as the function-component matrix (Strawbridge, 
McAdams, and Stone, 2002), a concept generator can be formed, and used to rapidly 
generate many different designs from a single functional model (Bryant, Stone, and 
McAdams, 2006). 
The failure mode taxonomy attempts to collect and define failure modes for 
electromechanical systems (Tumer, Stone, and Bell, 2003).  Like the functional basis, it 
had its roots in the work of Collins, using the list of mechanical failures as its beginning 
(Collins, et al., 1976).  Additional failure modes were added by empirical studying 
rotorcraft failure reports and accident reports from NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab (Tumer, 
Stone, and Roberts, 2003, Roberts, Stone, and Tumer, 2002).  These were supplemented 
with the electrical failure modes required for the highly automated systems used by 
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NASA.  Using this taxonomy with the functional basis and component basis allowed the 
creation of the Function Failure Design Method (FFDM), a means to link failure to 
component, and component to function, allowing the linking of function to failure, and 
allowing for failure analysis during the earliest stages of design (Stock, Stone, and 
Tumer, 2003).  This was expanded into the Risk in Early Design (RED) Method, which 
allowed the function-failure mode pairs to be rated into low, moderate, and high risk 
based on the historically determined likelihood and consequence of the risk (Grantham 
Lough, 2005). 
 
2.1.2 The Risk Mitigation Strategy Taxonomy.  The risk mitigation strategy 
taxonomy is a collection of terms used to define risk mitigation strategies, based on how 
they mitigate a risk (Wang and Roush, 2000).  The construction of the categories was 
based on a linguistic analysis of mitigation strategies.  Krus and Grantham recommended 
an approach based on the pragmatics sub-field of linguistics (2011).  This approach was 
based on similar work on risk elements performed by Grantham Lough et al. (2009).  
This pragmatics approach was chosen as communicating mitigation strategies is based on 
the context of the risk element they address, and pragmatics deals with how statements 
are used to communicate and how they relate to the context of a discussion (Barsalou, 
1992, Wilson and Keil, 1999).  This analysis used three theories of pragmatics, the 
Gricean Cooperation Principle (Barsalou, 1992), Functional Analysis (Green, 1996), and 
Relevance Theory (Wilson and Keil, 1999) to evaluate mitigation strategies. 
This approach identified six attributes important to communicating a mitigation 
strategy.  First was the failure mode the mitigation strategy tried to solve, followed by the 
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design parameters, aspects of the design the engineer has direct control over.  The design 
and environment changes documented the changes made to the design or environment in 
an attempt to reduce, control, or monitor the risk. The likelihood and consequence 
changes recorded if the strategy had an effect on the likelihood or consequence of the risk 
(Krus and Grantham, 2011).  Using these six attributes gave a common set of data to 
collect and use to record information about strategies. 
Using these attributes, 325 strategies were collected and grouped into categories.  
The first grouping was based on similar actions, such as all strategies that changed the 
geometry of the part grouped together.  These were then separated into three categories 
based on the different types of risk mitigation stated by Wang and Roush (2000).  The 
strategies that performed a change to reduce or remove risks were then divided into 
design and environment changes.  Design changes altered aspects of the design the 
engineer could controls, based on the design parameters of the product.  Environment 
changes attempted an external control of the failure, by controlling an environment 
parameter of the failure.  In addition to these categories, strategies were grouped based on 
the other purposes of risk mitigation:  monitoring strategies implemented observation and 
inspection techniques to monitor a failure as it progresses and planning strategies set up 
plans for unavoidable failures (Wang and Roush, 2000). 
Focusing on the 152 strategies that reduce or remove risks, the strategy names and 
definitions were further refined, using a verb-object form.  The verbs were taken from the 
functional basis, using the function the mitigation strategy performed.  The objects were 
empirically determined from the 325 case studies.  These were combined to form 42 
distinct mitigation strategies, which form the mitigation strategy taxonomy (Krus and 
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Grantham, 2012b). 
This mitigation strategy taxonomy provides a consistent language that can be used 
to classify and quantify risk mitigation data, allowing it to be processed and used to 
evaluate strategies against each other. 
 
2.2 Failure and Risk Mitigation Recording Matrix Techniques 
  Many successful failure prevention tools have used matrix techniques to store 
failure data and then link related concepts.  Several methods of applying matrices to 
FMEA have been suggested, such as the Failure Experience matrix suggested by Collins 
et al (1976, 1993), which recorded information on the failure modes, mechanical 
functions, and corrective action on different axes of a three dimensional matrix, or the 
Automated Advanced Matrix FMEA (Goddard and Dussalt, 1984), which used the 
outputs of the assembly under analysis, test points under analysis, comments, remarks, 
and references in the columns and the inputs of the assembly being analyzed and their 
failure modes as the rows. 
 
  2.2.1 The Risk in Early Design Method.  The RED method is a risk analysis tool 
that uses historical data to predict potential failure modes for a product (Grantham Lough, 
2005).  In order to perform this analysis, a knowledgebase of historical data needs to be 
collected, containing the failure modes, components, functions, and severities of recorded 
failures, which are used to populate the Function-Component (EC), Component-Failure 
(CF), and Component-Failure Severity (CF’) matrices.  These three matrices are used to 
populate the list of function-failure mode pairs, as well as calculate the likelihood and 
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consequence of each pair (Grantham Lough, et al., 2008a). 
To populate these databases, individual case studies and failure reports are 
analyzed, and the important information is determined and added to the knowledgebase.  
The first step is to identify the component and failure mode.  The report is analyzed to 
find the component that failed, translating it into a term from the component taxonomy.  
The failure mode is then identified in a similar fashion, using the failure mode taxonomy 
to identify the mode of the failure outlined in the report.  These two elements together 
identify that this particular component failed by this failure mode, and is used to 
increment that pair in the CF matrix (Grantham Lough et al., 2008b). 
 After that, severity of the failure is determined, using an integer scale from 1 to 5, 
with specific definitions for each integer value.  This is used with the component and 
failure mode to populate the CF’ matrix with the given severity for the component-failure 
mode pair.  The final step is determining   the function of the component, using the 
functional basis.  Once the function has been identified, the data for the function-
component pair is entered as a 1 in the EC matrix, which is binary (Grantham Lough et 
al., 2008b). 
 The EC and CF matrices can then be multiplied together to determine the 
Function-Failure Mode (EF) matrix.  This can be used with different mappings to 
determine failure modes for a given set of functions in a product, as well as their 
likelihood and consequence of risk.  All of this is formatted so that it can be displayed on 
a fever chart, to allow for easier understanding of where the risk in a product lies 
(Grantham Lough, 2005). 
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  2.2.2 The Generated Risk Event Effect Neutralization Method.  Using the 
mitigation strategy taxonomy, along with the important attributes determined from the 
linguistic analysis, data on mitigation strategies can be collected into a knowledge base 
and used to help select and compare strategies based on how they change the likelihood 
and consequence of risk, as well as their popularity.  This tool, the Generated Risk Event 
Effect Neutralization (GREEN) method, helps an engineer determine potential mitigation 
strategies for a risk by comparing the mitigation strategies in the taxonomy to what 
failure modes they have mitigated in the past, as well as helps the engineer compare the 
potential strategies based on the likelihood and consequence changes, as well as how 
often a strategy has been used (Krus and Grantham, 2012a). 
  Similar to RED, GREEN collects risk mitigation strategy data into matrices, and 
multiplies them together to form the links between failure modes and strategies.  In order 
to effectively use GREEN, a well-developed knowledge base needs to exist.  In order to 
populate the knowledgebase, risk mitigation strategies need to be cataloged into the 
knowledgebase in a form that can be used to perform calculations.  This knowledgebase 
takes the form of two matrices, the Failure-Parameter (FP) matrix, which records the 
failure modes and the corresponding parameters they apply to, and the Parameter-
Strategy (PS) matrix, which records which mitigation strategy, correspond to which 
parameters (Krus and Grantham, 2012a).  A third matrix, the Mitigation Strategy 
Likelihood-consequence Change (SC) matrix, contains information on the likelihood and 
consequence changes caused by the mitigation strategy. 
  Using these matrices, failure modes can be linked to mitigation strategy based on 
the parameters they have in common.  The FP and PS matrices are multiplied together 
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shown in equation (1), creating the Failure Mode-Mitigation Strategy (FS) matrix, which 
contains which mitigation strategies can mitigate which failure modes, and how 
frequently they’ve been encountered.  Using the FS matrix, the popularity of a mitigation 
strategy can be calculated, as shown in equation (2), where Ni is the number of 
occurrences in the FS matrix for the given strategy.  New likelihood and consequence 
values can be calculated using the SC matrix and the original likelihood and consequence 
of risk.  Shown in equations (3) and (4) are the new consequence and likelihood 
calculations for a given mitigation strategy and failure mode.  Loriginal is the original 
likelihood of risk for a function-failure mode pair, and Lchange is the likelihood change 
recorded in the SC matrix.  Similarly, Coriginal is the original consequence of risk for a 
function-failure mode pair, and Cchange is the consequence change recorded in the SC 
matrix (Krus and Grantham, 2012a). 
  (1) 
 
€ 
















Lnew = Loriginal 1− Lchange( ) (3) 
  (4) 
  These calculations provide a set of ratings that can be used to evaluate potential 
mitigation strategies for a given risk.  However, to provide the most accurate ratings 
possible, the GREEN knowledgebase should contain as much historical data as possible.  
Thus, new data needs to be added to the GREEN database so it can be used on a greater 
set of products. 
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3 KNOWLEDGEBASE CONSTRUCTION TO SUPPORT RISK MITIGATION 
THROUGH GREEN 
The languages of the risk mitigation strategy taxonomy and failure mode 
taxonomy form the backbone of the construction of the GREEN knowledgebase.  As 
stated previously, GREEN requires a knowledgebase of historical risk mitigation strategy 
information.  In order to populate that knowledgebase, information from failure reports 
with mitigation information are needed.  These reports can come from a number of 
different sources, such as consumer product failure reports, ASM handbooks, or 
corporate data. 
The first portion of the knowledgebase construction is the population of the 
Failure-Parameter (FP) matrix, which contains the failure modes and the parameters that 
correspond to them.  The second step is the recording the parameters that have 
correspond to a mitigation strategy in the Parameter-Strategy (PS) Matrix.  Finally, the 
likelihood and consequence change information is collected for each strategy and 
recorded into the Likelihood-Consequence Change (SC) Matrix. 
 
3.1 Population of the Failure-Parameter (FP) Matrix 
The Failure-Parameter (FP) matrix is used in the computation of the Fail-Strategy 
(FS) matrix, which is used to link failure modes to risk mitigation strategies.  The 
population of this matrix comes from failure mode reports, as well as existing failure 
mode parameter data, such as that collected in Krus and Grantham (2012a).  This matrix 
is formed from failure modes, which make up the rows, and parameters, which make up 
the columns.   
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When populating this matrix, first the failure mode given in the report must be 
determined.  If this is not explicitly stated, the context of the report can be used to deduce 
the failure mode.  Next, the parameters that caused or are related to the failure mode are 
determined.  These parameters can be the design and environment parameters used in the 
failure mode models, as presented Krus and Grantham (2010).  This matrix is a binary 
matrix, only recording that a parameter was related to a failure mode, not how frequently 
it has occurred.  Thus, in the FP matrix, a 1 should be entered for each combination of 
failure mode and parameter found, with 0 filling those with no relationship. 
The excerpt below is from a failure investigation published in the Handbook of 
Case Histories of Failure Analysis (Esakul, 1993). This excerpt will be used throughout 
this section to demonstrate how to populate a GREEN knowledgebase. 
A precipitation-hardened stainless steel poppet valve assembly used to shut off 
the flow of hydrazine fuel to an auxiliary power unit was found to leak. SEM 
and optical micrographs revealed that the final heat treatment designed for 
the AM-350 bellows material rendered the AM-355 Poppet susceptible to 
intergrannular corrosive attack (IGA) from a decontaminant containing 
hydroxyacetic acid. This attack provided pathways for which fluid could leak 
across the sealing surface in the closed condition. It was concluded that the 
current design is flight worthy if the poppet valve assembly passes a preflight 
helium pressure test. However, a future design should use the same material 
for the poppet and bellows so that the final heat treatment will produce an 
assembly not susceptible to IGA. 
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Most probable cause: The optimal heat treat for the AM-350 bellows 
transforms the microstructure of the AM-355 poppet to a sensitized structure 
susceptible to IGA. Residual decontaminant solution attacks the sealing 
surface in an intergranular fashion, because the sensitized microstructure has a 
chromium depletion layer immediately adjacent to the grain boundary. This 
attack provides pathways by which fluid can leak across the sealing surface 
when the assembly is closed. 
 
Remedial Action: The use of current poppet valve assemblies is acceptable if 
they pass the helium pressure test prior to each launch. Future efforts will 
focus on using the same material for the bellows and sealing surface. This 
material should not be susceptible to IGA. One recommendation is the use of 
AM-350 for the entire poppet valve assembly. This would allow optimum heat 
treatment of the assembly without sacrificing properties and would require 
less effort for requalification. Requalification is necessary for design/material 
changes of flight hardware (Esakul, 1993). 
 
The process of identifying the failure mode and the corresponding parameters for 
this example is detailed next. 
Identifying the Failure Mode: For this example, the “Most probable cause” 
section provided the specific detail that the failure was due to Intergranular Corrosion. 
Identifying the Parameters: From the “Most probable cause” section, the case lists 
the heat treatment of the product as leading to the ultimate failure, as well as the material 
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properties of the assembly itself, giving the parameters of temperature of the poppet and 
the material corrosive rates.  
Following this example, the intersections of “Intergrannular Corrosion” and 
“temperature” and “Intergrannular Corrosion” and “Material Corrosion Rate” should 
have a 1 entered, with the remaining entries filled with zeros. 
 
3.2 Population of the Parameter-Strategy (PS) Matrix 
The Parameter Strategy (PS) matrix is used to calculate the FS matrix.  This part 
of the knowledgebase collects the strategies used, as well as the parameters that were 
affected by the strategy or that the strategy focuses on.  This matrix is formed from 
parameters making up the rows, and mitigations strategies taken from the taxonomy 
making up the columns.  This matrix is incremented for each time a mitigation strategy 
makes a change to a given parameter.   
First, the mitigation strategy, chosen from the mitigation strategy taxonomy, 
needs to be identified.  Once the mitigation strategy has been determined, the parameter 
that was changed by the strategy need to be identified.  While, the parameters have 
already been determined while populating the FS matrix, when populating the PS matrix 
the particular parameter the strategy changed needs to be identified from that set.  After 
the mitigation strategy and the parameter have been determined, the intersection of that 
strategy and parameter is incremented by 1 in the PS matrix. 
The failure Report used in the section “Population of the Failure-Parameter (FP) 
Matrix” is used to provide and example of the mitigation strategy and affected 
parameters. 
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Identifying the Mitigation Strategy: For this example, the “Remedial Action” 
section provided a recommendation of “the use of AM-350 for the entire poppet valve 
assembly” as a means of solving the failure of this particular part. The changing of the 
material used in the part was identified as “Convert Material,” as the recommendation 
was to replace an existing material with a different material.  
Identifying the Affected Parameters:  The “Remedial Action” recommends 
changing the material of the poppet assembly.  This affects the corrosion rates identified 
in the “Population of the Failure-Parameter (FP) Matrix” section. 
Using this information, the intersection of “Convert Material” and “Material 
Corrosion Rates” in the PS is incremented by 1. 
 
3.3 Population of the Likelihood-Consequence Change (SC) Matrix 
The Likelihood-Consequence Change Matrix (SC) collects the changes to the 
likelihood and consequence of risk that are caused by the strategy, and is used in 
calculating the new likelihood and consequence value for the risk.  This matrix uses the 
mitigation strategies taken from the risk mitigation strategy taxonomy as the rows, and 
the likelihood and consequence changes as the columns.  For this matrix, the change to 
the likelihood and consequence of risk are recorded for the mitigation strategy 
determined while populating the PS matrix.  These values are percent changes, between 0 
to 100% for each mitigation strategy. 
The failure Report used in the section “Population of the Failure-Parameter (FP) 
Matrix” is used to provide and example of the likelihood and consequence changes. 
Identify the Likelihood Change: The example does not list a change for the 
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likelihood of risk.  However, by evaluating the change, the new material makes the 
product less susceptible to Intergrannular Corrosion.  As such, the likelihood of the risk is 
lowered by the mitigation strategy. 
Identify the Consequence Change: Similar to likelihood, no change is listed in the 
report itself.  Evaluating the strategy, the change of the material does not change the 
severity of the failure, should it still occur.  Thus, for this strategy, there is no 
consequence change. 
Using this information, the likelihood and consequence change entries for 
“Convert Material” are recorded as “Yes” for the likelihood change (as there is a change, 
but the value is unknown), and a 0% for the consequence change. 
 
3.4 Knowledgebase Construction Example 
The section ‘‘Population of the Failure Parameter (FP) matrix’’ provided a sample 
failure report to demonstrate the population of each GREEN knowledgebase matrix as 
they were presented. In this section, another sample failure report is provided. The intent 
of this example is to demonstrate the complete process of determining the matrix entries 
from failure reports as well as show how the two sample failure reports come together to 
form the beginnings of a knowledgebase. 
Catastrophic pitting corrosion occurred in type 304L stainless steel pipe 
flange assemblies in an industrial food processor. During regular service the 
pumped medium was pureed vegetables. In situ maintenance procedures 
included cleaning of the assemblies with a sodium hypochlorite solution. It 
was determined that the assemblies failed due to an austenite-martensite 
    
146 
galvanic couple activated by a chlorine bearing electrolyte. The martensitic 
areas resulted from a transformation during cold-forming operations. 
Solution annealing after forming, revision of the design of the pipe flange 
assemblies to eliminate the forming operation, and removal of the source of 
chlorine were recommended. 
Most probable cause: The most probably cause of the new stock pipe flange 
assembly failures was an austenite-martensite galvanic couple at the new 
stock pipe outer bends. The old stock pipe flange assemblies exhibited no 
austenite-martensite areas at the pipe outer bends; that is, the outer bends were 
fully austenitic. A strong contributing factor to the failure was chlorine 
contamination. 
Remedial action: Several recommendations were offered. The pipe should be 
solution annealed after the forming operation. A solution anneal reverts any 
martensite back into austenite, eliminating the potential for an austenite-
martensite galvanic couple. A fully austenitic condition usually ensures the 
highest possible degree of corrosion resistance. The pipe flange assembly 
design should be revised so that the pipe bend area material could be replaced 
with a molded inert plastic such as Teflon. The source of chlorine-bearing 
electrolyte should be removed by use of a chlorine-free cleaner that is 
aggressive to the pumped food product, but not the pipe. (Esakul, 1993) 
Using the procedures presented in the sections ‘‘Population of the Failure 
Parameter (FP) Matrix,’’ ‘‘Population of the Parameter-Strategy Matrix,’’ ‘‘Population 
of the Likelihood-Consequence Change Matrix,’’ and ‘‘Knowledgebase Construction 
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Example,’’ the knowledgebase entries are identified. 
Identifying failure mode: Galvanic Corrosion.  For this example, the report 
introduction and the “Most probable cause” section provided details that the failure was 
due to Galvanic Corrosion. 
Identifying parameters: Given the identified failure mode, Galvanic Corrosion, 
and recommendations offered in the “Remedial action” section, the report does not 
explicitly identify any parameters, but it can be deduced from the proposed material 
revision that material corrosive rates can be considered the parameter that relate to the 
failure mode.  Further, the attempt to clean the pipe shows that the environment corrosion 
rates are also important. 
Populating the FP Matrix: In the FP matrix, the intersection of “Galvanic 
Corrosion” and “Material Corrosion Properties has a 1 entered, leaving the other entries 
as 0. 
Identifying the mitigation strategy: For this example, the “Remedial action” 
section provided a few recommendations that can be translated into mitigation strategies. 
It states, “The pipe should be solution annealed after the forming operation.” This 
recommends annealing of the part, which identified a strategy to be “Condition Part.”  
This example also states “The pipe flange assembly design should be revised so that the 
pipe bend area material could be replaced with a molded inert plastic such as Teflon.” 
This recommends solving the failure by “Convert Material,” which indicates to change 
from one substance that makes up the part to another. Lastly, this section recommends, 
“The source of chlorine-bearing electrolyte should be removed by use of a chlorine-free 
cleaner that is aggressive to the pumped food product, but not the pipe,” which translates 
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to “Extract Contaminant.”  This strategy indicates to draw out foreign material whose 
presence can cause damage or deterioration of the product. 
Identifying the affected parameters:  For the three mitigation strategies, both 
“Condition Part” and “Convert Material” both affect the material corrosion rates.  
“Extract Contaminant,” on the other hand, affects the environment corrosion rates. 
Populating the PS matrix:  In the PS matrix, the intersections for “Condition Part” 
and “Material Corrosion Rate,” “Convert Material” and “Material Corrosion Rate,” and 
“Extract Contaminant” and “Environment Corrosion Rate” are each incremented by 1. 
Identify the Likelihood Change: As the previous example, this example also does 
not list a change for the likelihood of risk.  However, by evaluating the strategies, each of 
the strategies lower the likelihood of the risk.  Again, exact values for this change are 
unknown; a “Yes” is recorded for each of these mitigation strategies in the SC matrix.  
Identify the Consequence Change: Similar to likelihood, no change is listed in the 
report.  Evaluating each strategy, the change of the material does not change the severity 
of the failure, should it still occur in the future.  Thus, for each strategy, there is no 
consequence change.  A 0% is recorded in the SC matrix for each strategy. 
The results from the two presented failure cases thus far have been compiled into 
sample matrices to demonstrate the construction process of the knowledgebase. The 
Tables 1-3 below demonstrate the sample Failure Mode-Parameter, Parameter-Mitigation 
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Corrosion 0 1 1 
Galvanic 
















Corrosion Rate 0 0 1 
Material Corrosion 
Rate 1 1 0 
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Condition Part 0 Yes 
Convert Material 0 Yes 
Extract 




4 KNOWLEDGEBASE DESIGN CASE STUDY APPLICATION 
In an attempt to demonstrate how the GREEN method can be used to aid in risk 
mitigation, a GREEN analysis is performed on a wind turbine, a type of power plant that 
utilizes the wind currents to turn blades and power a generator.  This case study will 
demonstrate GREEN’s use in a design application, by demonstrating how mitigation 
strategies can be determined during conceptual design.  The GREEN knowledgebase 
used in this example was populated from 325 mitigation strategies from different sources 
(Esakul, 1993, Hatamura, 2009, Miller, 2011), covering many different 
electromechanical failures and mitigation strategies that create changes to reduce or 
remove risks. 
The first step in the process is a RED analysis of the wind turbine.  The functional 
model of the wind turbine shown in Figure 1 had a RED analysis performed on it to 
determine the potential risks.  The fever chart and the highest risks for this analysis are 
shown in Figure 2.  As seen in the fever chart, there are 56 total risk elements, with 1 
high-risk element, 7 moderate risk elements, and 48 low risk elements.  The high and 
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Figure 1. Wind Turbine Black Box and Functional Model 
 
Transfer Mechanical Energy fails due to High 
Cycle Fatigue 
(4, 4) 
Import Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Guide Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Export Gas fails due to High Cycle Fatigue (5, 2) 
Transfer Mechanical energy fails due to Impact 
Fracture 
(5, 1) 
Regulate Mechanical energy fails due to High 
Cycle Fatigue 
(5, 1) 




Transfer Mechanical energy fails due to Yielding (4, 2) 
  
Figure 2. Wind Turbine RED Analysis Fever Chart and High and Moderate Risk 
Elements 
 
Using the FS matrix, GREEN determined 20 mitigation strategies for High Cycle 
Fatigue, 14 for Impact Fracture, 0 for Thermal Shock, and 15 for Yielding.  These 
strategies are evaluated based on their popularity, and likelihood and consequence 
changes, using the appropriate calculations.  Shown below are the results of the analysis 
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for transfer mechanical energy failing due to high cycle fatigue, impact fracture, and 
yielding, all of which had strategies generated by GREEN.  The collected results, and 
how they compare, are shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6.  Using these strategies and ratings, 
along with engineering expertise, the best solutions for a given risk element can be 
selected. 
 








Frequency 1 4 <4 
Condition Material 2 4 <4 
Condition Part 2 4 <4 
Convert Material 3 3.84 3.84 
Convert Part 2 4 3.92 
Couple Part 1 4 <4 
Decrease Motion 1 4 <4 
Decrease Power 
Assist 1 4 <4 
Import Lubricant 1 4 <4 
Import Material 1 4 <4 
Import Part 1 4 <4 
Import Stress 1 4 <4 
Increase Controls 1 <4 <4 
Increase Flow 1 4 <4 
Remove Part 1 <4 <4 
Secure Part 2 <4 <4 
Separate 
Contaminant 1 4 <4 
Shape Part 5 4 <4 
Stabilize Process 1 4 <4 
Stop Process 1 4 <4 
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Material 3 5 <1 
Condition Part 4 5 <1 
Convert 
Material 4 4.8 0.96 
Convert Part 3 5 0.98 
Decrease Power 
Assist 1 5 <1 
Import 
Lubricant 1 5 <1 
Increase 
Controls 2 <5 <1 
Increase Flow 1 5 <1 
Position Part 1 5 <1 
Remove Part 1 <5 <1 
Separate 
Contaminant 1 5 <1 
Shape Part 5 5 <1 
Stabilize Flow 1 5 <1 
Stabilize Process 1 5 <1 
 
    
154 







Material 3 4 <2 
Condition 
Part 2 4 <2 
Convert 
Material 2 3.84 1.92 
Convert Part 1 4 1.96 
Couple Part 1 4 <2 
Decrease 
Load 1 4 <2 
Decrease 
Motion 1 4 <2 
Decrease 
Torque 1 4 <2 
Import 
Lubricant 2 4 <2 
Increase 
Controls 1 <4 <2 
Increase 
Load 1 4 <2 
Increase 
Torque 1 4 <2 
Position Part 1 4 <2 
Secure Part 1 <4 <2 




For each of these three function-failure mode pairs, “Shape Part” is the most 
popular strategy.  However, this strategy only affects the likelihood of the risk.  “Convert 
Material,” on the other hand, is either the second or third highest popularity strategy, and 
affects both the consequence and likelihood of risk, making the failure less likely to 
happen and less critical when it does happen.  Given the choices above, “Convert 
Material” would be the best option of these strategies. 
To verify this analysis, it was compared to 2 case studies that were not included in 
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the GREEN knowledgebase.  These two cases evaluate failures of the turbine’s gearbox 
due to several failure modes, such as impact fracture, yielding, and high cycle fatigue.  
The gearbox accomplishes transfer mechanical energy in the functional model in Figure 
1.  The first case study dealt with impact fracture, and recommended strategies of using 
improved 1st stage carriers with spherical bearings, improving retention be using a tighter 
fit or a locking mechanism, and adding a teeter damper to the design (Manwell et al, 
1999).  Translating these strategies into the mitigation strategy taxonomy, they become 
“Convert Part,” “Position Part,” and “Import Part,” respectively.  Examining the results 
for impact fracture, two of those strategies, “Convert Part” and “Position Part” were 
generated by the GREEN analysis.  
The second case study features solutions for the gear box that were generated as 
maintenance for gearboxes improve (Moser, 2010).  This case study gave solutions of 
using lubrication, tapered roller bearings, and refined material processing.  Converting 
into the mitigation strategy taxonomy, these become “Import Lubricant,” “Convert Part,” 
and “Condition Material.”  Examining the results for all three failure modes that transfer 
mechanical energy fails from, these three mitigation strategies are all generated by 
GREEN for all three failure modes. 
As shown here, the GREEN method allows quick generation and evaluation of 
mitigation strategies for risk elements, including being able to generate mitigation 
strategies for systems that were not included in its knowledgebase.  As it is independent 
of the experience of the engineer using the tool, even engineers with little training in risk 
mitigation can perform an analysis and determine potential mitigation strategies.  
Supplementing this with the engineer’s own experience, more detailed plans can be 
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created from these strategies, expanding on this initial generation of strategies, allowing 
for better mitigation strategy generation. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The GREEN method provides an intuitive method for cataloging risk mitigation 
strategies so that these solutions to past failures can be used to prevent future risks.  
Current risk mitigation methods rely on the expertise of teams of engineers to generate 
the strategies to mitigate risks.  This process can lead to subjective results that can 
overlook aspects of the risk, or not consider potential solutions for a risk.  The GREEN 
method provides a means to use historical data to cover the potential gaps. 
The GREEN method is not intended as a replacement for the expertise of 
engineering teams and other mitigation methods.  It is intended to be used to perform risk 
mitigation early in the design process, allowing the mitigation of a failure to be taken into 
account throughout the design process.  With a properly developed knowledgebase of 
mitigation strategy data, a team can generate mitigation strategies based on successful 
historical mitigation strategies, supplementing their experience with historical 
knowledge.  GREEN provides a useful tool in the designer’s toolbox for combating 
unexpected failures in a product.  Therefore, GREEN promotes failure prevention 
through the cataloging of successful mitigation strategies. 
 
6 FUTURE WORK 
Future work on this project is a more complete knowledgebase of risk mitigation 
strategy data, as such a knowledgebase can always be improved.  In addition to this, a 
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numerical scale for determining the likelihood and consequence changes will be 
determined, to allow mitigation strategies that lower the likelihood or consequence of risk 
but do not state how much to be measured. 
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2.  CONCLUSIONS 
 This dissertation presented the risk mitigation strategy taxonomy and the GREEN 
method.  The taxonomy is a useful tool that enables communication of mitigation 
strategies between groups, and allows for the collection of mitigation strategy data.  
Using this processed data allows for the generation of mitigation strategies, as shown by 
the GREEN method. 
 These two parts form the components and tools to helping construct a successful 
mitigation for a product.  The risk mitigation strategy taxonomy provides the building 
blocks, identifying the potential plans that can be put into action.  GREEN then evaluates 
which of those plans are applicable to the given situation, and how they compare to each 
other. 
The risk mitigation strategy taxonomy and GREEN are not meant as replacements 
for currently used means of generating and evaluating mitigation strategies, but as tools 
to supplement and enhance it, using historical data to help cover gaps in an individual 
engineer’s experience.  By using these tools in conjunction with other tools and 
engineering experience, a better mitigation can be performed on a product, leading to a 
more failure free product. 
 


















FAILURE MODE MODELS 
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Table A1.  Failure Mode Models 
Failure Mode Equation Description 







Pcr = max critical 
load (S) 
E = modulus of 
elasticity (D) 
I = moment of 
inertia (D) 
Le = effective length 





















Corrosion rates exist for different materials 
and environments 
- 
Brinelling [36] Brinnell Hardness Test/ Material Hardness Harder materials are 












δ = deformation 
length (S) 
P = load (S) 
A = cross sectional 
area (D) 
E = modulus of 
elasticity (D) 
L = length of 
member (D) 
Yielding [37] Maximum Sheer Stress  τmax = maximum 
sheer stress (S) 


































σ 3 = 
principal stresses (S) 
Sy = yield strength 
(D) 
Sc = compressive 
strength (D) 










= C(ΔK)m  
a = crack growth (S) 
C & m = material 
properties (D) 
K = Stress intensity 
factor (D) 















+ ε' f (2N)c  
ε = strain (S) 
€ 
σ f , b, εf, c = 
material constants 
(D) 
E = modulus of 
elasticity (D) 




V = Klw / p V = volume lost (S) 
K = wear coefficient 
(D) 
l = sliding distance 
(D) 
w = normal load (S) 















 Pm = nominal contact pressure (D) 
€ 
σ YP = uniaxial yield 
point stress (D) 
W = load (S) 
Aa = apparent 













V = impact velocity 
(S) 
€ 
σ  = stress (S) 
ε = strain (S) 
ρ = density of 
material (D) 













Vmax = critical 
impact velocity (S) 
€ 
σ  = stress (S) 
ε = strain (S) 




Maximum Normal Stress 
€ 
σ1 ≥ Sut  or 
€ 





n  when 
€ 









n  when 
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n  when 
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n  when 
€ 
σA ≥σB ≥ 0  
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n  when 
€ 





n  when 
€ 
σA ≥σB ≥ 0  
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    when  
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n  when 
€ 
0 ≥σA ≥σB  
σA > σB = plane 
stresses (S) 
Suc = ultimate 
compressive strength 
(D) 
Sut = ultimate tensile 
strength (D) 







K ≥ KIC  K = stress intensity 
factor (S) 
KIC = critical stress 
intensity factor (D) 















 Ls  
dabr = abrasive wear 
depth (S) 
tanθm = weighted 
mean value of 
asperities (D) 
σYP = uniaxial yield 
point stress (D) 
W = load (S) 
Aa = apparent 
contact area (D) 

























 <σYP  
dadh = adhesive wear 
depth (S) 
k = wear constant 
(D) 
σYP = uniaxial yield 
point stress (D) 
W = load (S) 
Aa = apparent 
contact area (D) 
Ls = sliding distance 
(D) 
Impact Wear [39] 
€ 

















W = wear mass (S) 
K = sliding wear 
coefficient (D) 
€ 
P  = average load 
(S) 
N = number of 
cycles (S) 
X= slip (D) 
H = hardness of 
softer material (D) 
K, j, n = impact wear 
coefficients (D) 
Ai = initial contact 
area (D) 













 for bearings 
N = life in cycles (S) 
C = constant for a 
given bearing (D) 
P = bearing load (S) 







Vmax = dielectric 
strength of material 
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(D) 
V = voltage between 
surfaces (S) 
D = distance 







Vmax = dielectric 
strength of material 
(D) 
V = voltage between 
surfaces (S) 
D = distance 






Lifetime = A ⋅10−βEox e(Ea / kT ) A= scaling constant 
(S) 
β = electric 
acceleration factor 
(D) 
Eox = applied stress 
electric field (D) 
Ea = Temperature 
acceleration factor 
(D) 
k = Blotzmann’s 
constant (S) 








kT  for a wire 
MTTF = Mean time 
to Failure (S) 
A = constant based 
on area (D) 
J = current density 
(S) 
Ea = activation 
energy (D) 
k = Boltzmann’s 
constant (S) 
n = scaling factor (S) 
T = temperature (S) 
Galvanic 
Corrosion [35] 

















(2N)b + ε' f (2N)c  
a = crack growth (S) 
C & m = material 
properties (D) 
K = Stress intensity 
factor (D) 
N = number of 
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cycles (S) 
ε = strain (S) 
€ 
σ f , b, εf, c = 
material constants 
(D) 




Imax2 rR = θmax −θA  Imax = maximum 
current (S) 
r = resistance (D) 
R = thermal 
resistance (D) 
θmax = maximum 
temperature (S) 
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Table B1.  Risk Mitigation Strategies, with Mitigation Attributes 
 
 






















MITIGATION STRATEGY OUTPUTS 
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To render the substance that 
makes up the product or part 





YES YES Tensile Strength
Condition Part
To render a component or 
portion of the overall product 








NONE YES Tensile Strength Stress
Convert 
Material
To change from one substance 









NONE YES Tensile Strength Stress  
Convert Part
To change from one component 




NONE YES Tensile Strength
Increase 
Controls
To enlarge a set of orders or 
rules that are followed to keep 
the product within proper 






YES YES Tensile strength  
Position Part
To place a component or portion 
of the overall product into a 





To mold or form a component or 








NONE YES Yield Strength Stress
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To adjust or alter the harmonic 
frequency of an object in a 









To render the substance that 
makes up the product or part 









To change from one substance 











To change from one substance 









To join or bring together 
components or portions of the 
overall product such that the 
members are still 






To bring in a substance that 
makes up the product or part 








To bring in a component or 
portion of the overall product 








To bring in a force distributed 
through an area of a product 








To firmly fix a component’s or 













To mold or form a component or 











To cease, or prevent, the 
transfer of a step or operation in 
the manufacture of a product.
Thermal 
Fatigue 
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